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The hypothesis of this work is that the political
rhetoric of the Serbian leader, Milosevic, was among the
major factors contributing to the political and social
changes in Serbia and Yugoslavia,

which ultimately led to

the war.
Three of Milosevic's speeches were studied in
detail:

the speeches of April 24,

and November 19,

1988.

1987, October 17,

1988,

The method of rhetorical analysis

was adopted from Andrews

(1990) because this method

stresses the importance of context and effects of the
speech.

The theories of political language

1981) and of political rhetoric
with Johannesen's

(Bitzer,

(1989) theory of

(Graber,

1981) together

ethics in political

persuasion were utilized in the analyses.
The analyses of the speeches in regard to their
level of complexity suggests that a shift occurred in
Milosevic's rhetoric,

from rhetoric high in the level of

complexity to simplistic and value-laden statements, and
thus low in the level of complexity.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

The purpose of this work is to examine the rhetoric
of Slobodan Milosevic,

the Serbian leader,

and its influ

ence on the political changes and the on-going war that
is occurring in the former Yugoslav state.

The hypothe

sis to be examined is that the political rhetoric of
Slobodan Milosevic was among the major factors contribut
ing to the political and social changes in Serbia and
Yugoslavia which ultimately led to the war.
The research focuses on the literature of four major
theoretical groups.

The first chapter reviews the study

of political communication,

which assesses how political

processes are seen from a communication perspective.
Selected theories from this group will be utilized in the
analysis of the speeches.

The second chapter deals with

the methods to be utilized in this project;

specifically,

material on rhetorical criticism as a subfield of the
historical-critical method is reviwed.

The third chapter

provides the historical context for the speeches of
Milosevic.

The fourth chapter describes and analyzes

1
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three of Milosevic's speeches.

This chapter also uses

various publications on the political processes in
Yugoslavia, mainly utilized in the analysis of the spee
ches selected for study.

This group of literature is

used to assess how much the rhetoric of Slobodan
Milosevic corresponded with the major social and po l i t i 
cal processes and how much it served as a means in a ccom
plishing a political goal.
The major motive for writing the thesis on this
topic originates from the author's desire to shed some
light on the complex Yugoslav situation.

With no p r e 

tense to advance clear-cut answers to the problems that
pervade this troubled area,

the author hopes this work

will provide some insights into the dynamics of the
political processes which propelled the destruction of
Yugoslavia.

Review of Literature

As a type of historical-critical research
Weaver,

& Berryman-Fink,

1981),

(Tucker,

rhetorical criticism is

dedicated to the spirit of critical inquiry— a desire to
find the "whole truth" about the public speeches with
which it deals

(Thonssen, Baird,

& Braden,

In historical-critical research,

1970).

Tucker et a l .

(1981) insist that the researcher must examine the social

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

milieu into

which an event is fitted.

insist that

every speech-communication scholar

should

know how to

study the past, because history is

a reflec

tion of the

people, their aspirations, values,

and b e 

liefs.

The same authors

That rhetorical criticism requires an historical-

critical approach is understandable because a given
event,

in our case, a speech,

is the product of a complex

of social events in which human beings are identified
with their environment

(Thonssen et al.,

1970).

Rhetori

cal criticism reveals the nature of the process by which
a communicative intent finally implements,

or fails to

implement,

1970, p . 24).

social action

Andrews

(Thonssen et al.,

(1990) sees the critic of rhetoric as focus

ing his or her attention on human efforts to be persua
sive.

Although the students of the art of rhetoric have

not achieved universal agreement on what the critic of
rhetoric should be studying,

to Andrews

(1990) both

common sense and evidence presented by what critics
actually study suggest that

"persuasive public discourse

is an obvious and sensible object of critical examina
tion"

(p. 3).
To Aristotle,

the classical theorist most concerned

with political values,

rhetoric was the art or faculty of

discovering the available means of persuasion in any
given case

(Larsen,

1989, p.

9).

Brock and Scott

(1980)
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define rhetoric as the human effort to induce cooperation
through the use of symbols.

Prelman

(1969) defines

rhetoric as the theory and practice of all arguments
which aim to persuade and convince the audience in p olit
ical and other human fields.

Modern and contemporary

theorists regard rhetoric broadly as a method of inquiry
and communication applicable to spoken and written di s 
course

(Bitzer,

1981).

These few definitions serve as an example of the
character of rhetoric.

They demonstrate that with rheto

ric comes an effort to persuade.

Both ancient and modern

authorities agree that the fundamental purpose of public
speeches is to induce some sort of social control,

that

is, desirable political outcomes

1970).

(Thonssen et al.,

This striving for social control is vividly ex
pressed in political discourse.

In its most elemental

sense, political discourse deals with the major issues of
public life (Dunner,

1964).

It is this which makes

politics and political rhetoric a serious matter of
i n t erest.
The recognized significance of the relationship
between communication and political processes has led to
the emergence of an independent field of study— political
communication

(Nimmo & Sanders,

1981).

Political commu

nication is devoted to studying the strategic uses of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

communication to influence public knowledge, beliefs,

and

action on political matters

In

its political dimension,

1990).

communication is a force for

both conflict and consensus;
and marginalization.

(Nimmo & Swanson,

it causes both empowerment

Political communication scholars

are thus interested in finding the meaning of political
messages,
quences

and how this meaning leads to political conse

(Nimmo & Swanson,

1990, p . 17).

These consequenc

es may be as large as the preservation of the state and
the well being of each and every citizen,

or as small as

a single individual's wealth.
A discussion of political rhetoric and political
language reveals

how communication and politics are

interrelated areas.
Political rhetoric deals with matters that consti
tute political business,

that is, all transactions and

their consequences which significantly affect the public
or its parts.

Political rhetoric serves the art of

politics at every turn, both as a mode of thought and as
an instrument of expression and action
225).

(Bitzer,

1981, p.

Political actors in their communication engage

interests, values,

emotions and aspirations.

Consequent

ly, messages designed for political persuasion use argu
ments that are linked to valued premises,

facts that are

linked to interests, descriptions and visions that evoke

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

emotions

(Bitzer,

1981; Graber,

1981).

It is in this context— the use of arguments,

that the

ethos of the communicator becomes an important part of
the rhetorical situation.

Johannesen

concerned with ethics in persuasion,

(1989), who is
describes a d ema

gogue as an unethical communicator who enjoys popular
support,

and who exerts his influence primarily through

the medium of spoken word,
37).

that is public speaking (p.

According to Johannesen

(1989), a demagogue relies

heavily on propaganda "defined in the negative sense of
intentional use of suggestion,
appeals,

irrelevant emotional

and pseudoproof to circumvent human rational

decision-making processes"

(p. 37).

A demagogue also

uses the available social problems to advance his or her
personal position

(Johannesen,

1989, p.

37).

Bitzer

(1981) touches on an ethical aspect of political rhetoric
in that part where he distinguishes between rhetoric,
which insists on rational justification,

and persuasion,

which implies the lack of critical consideration.

Bitzer

(1981) maintains that "[t]he craft of persuasion reduces
truth and value to the role of tactic for the sake of
making people believe or do what the communicator d e 
sires, while rhetoric is committed to truth and value as
regulative principles

(p. 229).

In his study of politics and language,

Corcoran
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7
(1990) attempts to defy the widespread notion that
tics is all talk."

"poli

His differentiation of "talk" and

political action is well argued:
and empowers its users,

"while language shapes

the unhappy consequence is that

language reproduces and reinforces exploitation,
ity and other traditions of power"

(p. 53).

inequal

The same

author argues that language is a paradigm of political
action which offers a perspective for theoretical inquiry
into social and political life (p. 51).
Graber (1981) sees political language as the tool of
politicians who rose to power because they could talk
persuasively to voters and political elites.
somewhat contrary to Corcoran

This is

(1990) who finds it diffi

cult to distinguish between language and politics,
sees all language as political
setting,

"[b]ecause every speech

however private and intimate,

relations,

and

involves power

social roles, privileges and centered meaning"

(p. 53).
Graber

(1981) differs from Corcoran also in her view

on the impact of setting on political language,

stating

that different settings influence the character of the
political rhetoric.

For the purpose of this research,

the discussion of the oratory setting is of primary
import.

Graber (1981) defines the oratory setting as a

public event where the orator is fully in control of the
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speech situation.

Public oratory, which Graber says is

reserved only for chief authority figures to address
large audiences about predominantly political issues,
highly influential

(Graber,

is

1981, p. 210).

Depending on the appeals political orators use to
convey their message to their audiences,

Graber

(1981)

classifies the styles of the oratory as statesman's,
charismatic,

and demagogic oratory.

Statesman's oratory

appeals to reasoned argument and intellectual explanation
of the issues at hand.

The salient issues are presented

clearly and in moderate language without emotionally
charged distractions

(Graber,

1981, p. 210).

The underlying characteristic of charismatic rheto
ric, Graber

(1981) claims,

is a speaker who possesses the

ability to vocalize the emotions and ideals deeply held
by a large number of people.

The audience of a charis

matic leader in turn feels that it has a spokesperson who
is expressing its deeply felt needs;

hence it is more

likely to follow the orders of charismatic rhetors

(p.

2 1 1 ).
Demagogic rhetoric appeals to emotions on a baser
level,

like prejudice,

hatred,

and bigotry.

The appeals

used by demagogues are opportunistic,

thus leaving little

room for truth and fairness

1981, p. 212).

(Graber,

The basic function of political language is to
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convey a message.

It is the medium through which the

communicative function of the speech is fulfilled
(Thonssen et a l . 1970).

Graber

(1976) describes politi

cal language as a separate entity,

a language that p o l i t 

ical discourse endows with special potency.

To her, what

makes verbal and nonverbal language political is not a
distinctive vocabulary or form, but the "substance" of
the information it conveys,

the context in which this

information is disseminated and the functions that p olit
ical languages perform (Graber,

1981).

One of these functions of language is to interpret
the political scene in the process of calling attention
to situations, people,

and events

(Graber,

1981, p . 203).

This function of language enables political elites to
create reality through linking their own actions to
acceptable motives, goals and developments.
rhetors chose to make,
causes,

The linkages

explicitly or implicitly,

concepts or analogies,

impact of their messages

to

shape the meaning and

(Bormann,

1973).

The symbolist

approach to rhetoric has been particularly interested in
the interpretative function of political discourse.
his fantasy theme analysis Bormann

In

(1973) discovered how

the use of the dramatic creation of social reality p r o 
vides a powerful instrument in political persuasion.
Politicians use language to create messages that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

will persuade or induce people to act, that will produce
policy relevant moods such as hope or fear, pride in
country,

or a sense of community and nationhood (Graber,

1981, p. 207).

Political messages may be especially

dangerous when they turn into action itself.
(1981) perceives,

the threat or promise,

As Graber

or fear or

blame, may have an impact akin to that of the potential
action provided it is believed by a significant audience.
The political rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic,

the

current leader of Serbia, appeared to have had such a
strength— to turn the promises given to his fellow Serbs
into actions that caused blood and ruins.

For this

reason, this research applies the theories of Bitzer
(1981), Graber

(1981), and Johannesen

of three of Milosevic's speeches.

(1989) to the study

The method of study is

described in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

Speeches to Be Analyzed

The objective of this study is to describe and
analyze the rhetorical strategies used by the Serbian
leader,

Slobodan Milosevic,

prior to the start of the war

in Yugoslavia.
Among many speeches,

three will be studied.

first is the speech of April 24,

The

1987, delivered to the

Serbs in Kosovo, the Albanian-populated province attached
to Republic of Serbia.

This event marked the public

beginning of Milosevic's populist leadership strategy,
as Engelberg (1991) says,

or

"it will transform his image

from faceless bureaucrat to charismatic Serb leader"

(p.

32) .
The second is the speech of October 17,

1988, given

at the 17th League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Central Committee Session in Belgrade.

(LCY)

As President of

the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists
(LC) Presidium, Milosevic attacked the opponents of
constitutional reforms in Serbia and demanded their
removal.

This speech is important also because it
11
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declared the "meetings of solidarity" as legal tools to
protest the supposed anti-Serbian "terror" in Kosovo.
These meetings of solidarity,

encouraged by Milosevic's

policies became a political means used to remove the
legal governments of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Later, the

themes of these meetings formed the rationale for
Serbia's abolition of the juridic autonomy of the two
provinces

(McCrea,

1992).

The third is the speech of November 19,

1988, deliv

ered at the Meeting of Brotherhood and Unity in Belgrade.
In this speech Milosevic openly invited the Serbs to
fight for the establishment of the Serbian state.

The

Serbian people apparently decided to follow their charis
matic leader because he touched something that had been a
taboo-topic for many years:
(Tijanic,

1989),

Serbian national pride

and the sense of Serbian grievances in

the post-1945 Yugoslav state.

The eventual result of

this can be seen in the war which raged over Yugoslavia
as Serbs outside of Serbia,

first in Croatia,

then in

Bosnia attempted to grab as much territory as possible by
force of arms.
All these speeches are published in Milosevic's book
(1989) Godine raspleta

[The years of solutions].

This

book is written in Serbian using the Serbian Cyrillic
Alphabet.

These speeches are also translated in the
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United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(F B I S ) , Daily R e p o r t : East E u r o p e .

The analysis of the

speeches is based on the researcher's translation from
Milosevic's Serbian text.
against the FBIS source.

This translation was validated
Author's translation of the

speeches can be found in the Appendix.

Method of Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetorical analysis,

like any form of interpretation

is in many ways a risky enterprise.

Analysis,

judgment,

and interpretation of the rhetorical act must take into
consideration the complex ways in which rhetoric inter
acts with the values and cultural standards of a society
(Andrews,

1990, p. 5).

By means of analysis the critic hopes to determine
the effect of the speech,

immediate or postponed,

the particular audience and society.

upon

The word "effect"

is important because it expresses a central reason for
rhetorical criticism (Thonssen et al.,

1970).

While the field of rhetoric is rich in rules and
procedures designed to guide rhetorical analysis
(Stuckey,

1989), this study was guided by the theory and

model of rhetorical criticism which J. R. Andrews

(1990)

offered in his work, The Practice of Rhetorical Criti
cism.

It seemed the most applicable to the topic of
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research because it represented a theory that would give
the researcher enough freedom to assess cultures other
than American,

and because it was concerned with the

impact of such a context on the speaker,
the intended audience.

his message and

The second reason for selecting

Andrews' model was the importance he ascribed to the
historical background of the speech.
to this topic of research because

This was applicable

"[p]olitical me s s a g 

es... are linked so closely to historical situations that
we must understand the details of the situation as a
condition of understanding the meaning of the message"
(Bitzer,

1981, p. 239).

While any rhetorical act is a complex,
whole, Andrews

(1990) maintains,

rated as analytically distinct:
sage/speech,

be divided into subcategories,
vidual emphasis

(Andrews,

four parts can be sepa
context,

and consequences.

interrelated

speaker, m e s 

Each of these in turn can
all of which merit indi

1990).

The first element of a rhetorical act is the context
encompassing that act.

The context consists of the

prevailing political and ethical climates and the major
issues of the time.

Context also involves the audience

of the rhetorical discourse.

This audience is both

immediate--those who actually witness the speech,

and

potential— those who may hear or read the speech

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15
(Andrews,

1990, pp. 22-30).

The second element of a rhetorical act is the rhetor
or the speaker,

the individual who delivers the speech,

hoping to accomplish a specific goal.
analytic approaches to the rhetor.

There are three

The first is to

examine his/her motives, which involves careful analyses
of the orator's strategy,

or plan, by which he/she hopes

to keep the speech achieving its goal
1970).

(Thonssen et al.,

Second, any given rhetor has an ethos.

The ethos

is a combination of the image a rhetor wishes to project
and the one that the audience perceives.

It combines the

past actions of the speaker with factors influencing
audience perceptions of those actions

(Andrews,

1990).

Persuasive style is the final analytic element of the
rhetor.

The critical analysis of the style is guided by

the careful examination of the functions of language in
discourse.

The critic's goal is to describe the ways in

which language is used to promote the speech and the
hoped for influences of this use of language on listeners
(Andrews,

1990; Bitzer,

1981).

The third element of a rhetorical act is the speech
itself— the collection of and connection between words
(Stacey,

1989).

that also serve
style, appeals,

Any speech can be broken into four units
as analytical categories.
arguments,

and grammar

These are

(Andrews,

1990).
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In the analysis and criticism of Milosevic's speeches the
study primarily concentrated on appeals and arguments.
In the assessment of these categories the following
theories were used: Johannesen's
demagogue,

Bitzer's

and persuasion,
oratory,

(1989) definition of a

(1981) distinction between rhetoric

and Graber's

(1981) typology of public

as previously explained in the first chapter.

The final element of a rhetorical act is its conse
quences.

This element is best expressed in the question:

"What potential did the message have to influence what
audience in what ways?"

(Andrews,

1990, p. 6).

This

element is a summary of the other three in that it com
bines rhetor,

context,

and the speech itself, and looks

at the rhetorical act as a whole.

Answering this que s 

tion involves looking at both purpose and possibility of
the message.

These two dimensions are essential for

understanding rhetorical effect.
The major concern of this study was the effects of
Milosevic's political rhetoric.

Great emphasis was put

on the historical and immediate context of the speeches,
because,

as Bitzer

(1981)

earlier observed,

in order to

understand the meaning of the political message, we must
understand the situation in which the speeches took
place.
context.

The following chapter depicts the historical
This should help understanding of the power of
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Milosevic's rhetoric to influence the events that led to
the beginning of the War on the Yugoslav territory.
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CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Introduction

Every problem has its roots in the past.
simple or obvious this statement,

it seems to fit pe r 

fectly the complex Yugoslav situation.
noted that it was

However

Singleton

(1985)

"impossible to understand contemporary

Yugoslavia without some knowledge of the historical
experiences which are so deeply imbedded in the con
sciousness of the people"

(p. i x ) .

In 1991, when

Yugoslavia was facing the most serious crisis in its 70
years old statehood,
than ever before.

Singleton's thesis is more salient

The complicated task of presenting

Yugoslav history becomes even more difficult today,
because lately so many participants in that history are
demanding that
Pavlowitz

the "new" history be written.
(1988) thinks that a real understanding of

Yugoslav history since 1918, when the state was estab
lished under the name of the Unified Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes,

"calls for a completely free inquiry

by professional scholars,
xii).

echoed by a public debate"

(p.

The Communist regime that ruled Yugoslavia from
18
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1945 to 1990,

like its monarchical predecessor,

intensely-

insisted on the heroic presentation of events.
war Yugoslavia,
movement,

In p o s t 

the history of the interwar Communist

the Second World War,

and the civil war which

occurred during the World War II, was written under the
supervision of the Communist Party.

A. Djilas

states that in spite of the party's

(1991)

"historiographic

orthodoxy," many Yugoslav historians have not been ready
to misrepresent historical events.
quiet about events that were,

They, however,

kept

from the party's point of

view, particularly "sensitive," that is, events that
called attention to the problems of nationalism.

This

troubled relationship between the Communist party and
history resulted in a large amount of "dissident litera
ture" published abroad that dealt mainly with the issues
about which Yugoslavs had to remain silent,

for example,

I. Supek's book Krunski sviedok protiv Hebranaa

(1983)

which was literally smuggled across the Yugoslav-Italian
border,

and much of M. Djilas's later work.

Since the

death of President Tito in May 1980, the consequent
liberalization of intellectual life has brought many
serious challenges to the official

"Titoist" interpreta

tion of modern Yugoslav history.
Thus, one cannot present an "objective" history of
Yugoslavia.

All one can do is to take into account

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20
different views on problematic issues in describing
Yugoslavia's turbulent and often painful past.

Yugoslavia as a State

On December 1, 1918, the Unified Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed.

Even then,

this first common South Slavic State was unofficially
referred to as Yugoslavia,

the name it officially assumed

in 1929.
Yugoslavia emerged as the result of the changing
international situation of the early 20th century, but
the idea of South Slavic integration,

Yugoslavenstvo,

evolved in the 1860s under the leadership of the Bishop
of Zagreb,

Josip Juraj Strossmajer, who was known as a

great philanthropist and the founder of the Yugoslav
Academy,

established in 1866

(Banac,

1984).

This m o v e 

ment was primarily cultural and academic in character.
Its predominant goal was to resist the denationalization
imposed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The proponents

of Yugoslavism, mainly of Croatian nationality,
nized the Serb and Slovene nationhood.

recog

However, the

belief that Yugoslavism meant respect for the nationhood
and independence of each South Slav nation was not as
prevalent among the Serbs as among the Croats.

Banac

(1984) explained that it could not have been otherwise
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because the national ideologies were extremely different.
The Serbs had an independent national state with a histo
ry of expansion and assimilation, while the Croats and
Slovenes had few state traditions.
The official Serbian version of a South Slavic
state, as advocated by the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola
Pasic at the time of World War I, was burdened by visions
of Serbian expansionism.

So the first South Slav state

was proclaimed amid tensions and a fundamental mutual
misunderstanding between the Serbian representatives and
the Yugoslav Committee
sented the Croats,

(Jugoslavenski odbor) which repre

Slovenes and Serbs who had been the

citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy.
The unification did not establish any guarantees
against the dominance of the Serbian monarchy, whose
troops were already occupying former Habsburg South
Slavic possessions and Montenegro,
age-old dream of Serb unification.

thus realizing the
Banac

(1984)

explained,
Given the role of the Serbian state in the construc
tion of Yugoslavia and the actual if not formal
continuation of Serbian state institutions after the
unification, the Serbs could adjust to the new cir
cumstances without a feeling of loss, without feel
ing deprived of their sense of national individuali
ty (p.138) .
For Croats and Slovenes,
so simple.

however,

the unification was not

Barely a month after the end of their long
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subordination to the Habsburg Monarchy,

they were now

bound into a unitary state with Serbia and Montenegro.
Moreover,

the decision to unite with Serbia was made for

them in such circumstances by a group of men who, accord
ing to Banac

(1984), did not know how to establish and

use political power.
The sense of Yugoslav unity may have had some m e a n 
ing to middle-class professional politicians,
lawyers, and intellectuals who promoted the idea of a
South Slav state, but it did not penetrate deeply into
the consciousness of the mass of the peasantry who con
stituted more than 80% of the population
1985).

(Singleton,

None of the South Slavic nationalities,

including

the Serbs, had an opportunity to express their preferenc
es by means of popular referendum.

Among the Croats a

democratic test of popular sentiment would probably have
demonstrated substantial opposition,
the unification with the Serbs
1983).

if not dislike,

(Banac,

1984;

to

Supek,

Among the Slovenes the opposition to unification

was stifled by the external danger of partition between
Italy and Austria.
Once the monocratic characteristics of the new state
were firmly established,

various forms of domestic oppo

sition arose in all non-Serbian areas,

even among the

educated and wealthy classes which were considered stron
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gly unitarist in 1918.
Slovenes,

Croats,

above, on a

The leaders of the Kingdom of the

and Serbs attempted to impose from

heterogeneous mixture of different social

and cultural groups,

a common set of rules and a common

political and economic order, under Serbian dominance.
The "founding fathers" of Yugoslavia pretended that a
Yugoslav nation already existed.

They ignored the exis

tence of Slovene as a language separate from Serb and
Croatian.

They disregarded the differences in worldviews

which had evolved during centuries of life under differ
ent regimes.

No consideration was given to the great

numbers of the non-Slavic population

(17% of the total)

who did not have any reason to identify themselves with
the Kingdom.

Singleton

(1984)

expressed the result:

"By

ignoring the realities of life at the grass roots, the
constitution makers sowed dragon's teeth which continue
to yield bitter harvest"

(p.134).

In 1918 in Yugoslavia there were two governments,
six custom areas,

five currencies,

using three different gauges,

four railway networks

three banking systems,

and

the remnants of four legal systems which had to be assim
ilated into a common code of law.

The first general

elections for the Constituent assembly (Ustavotvornu
Skupstinu) were held on the whole territory of the new
state in 1919.

They resulted in the following: Radicals,
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27%; Democrats,
Peasant Party,

17% (both Serbian parties);
14%; and Communists 12%

Croatian

(Pavlowitz,

1988).

A Serbian Radical-Democrat coalition decided that
the constitutional document would be passed by a simple
majority.

This led to a Croatian Peasant Party boycott

on the grounds that the electoral arrangements were
rigged to favor the Serbs.
cause from the beginning.

This weakened the Croatian
Pavlowitz

(1988) describes the

Constitution of 28 June 1921 as, in effect,

the Serbian

constitution adapted to the needs of a larger Yugoslav
unit.

It merely updated the old Serbian structure of a

parliamentary government under the Serbian monarchy,
keeping the triple name of the state as a concession to
non-Serbian feelings.

The fact that the constitution was

declared on June 28 served as another reminder that The
Kingdom of Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes was in reality

Greater Serbia (Singleton,
national day, Vidovdan

1985).

That day is Serbia's

(St. Vitus day), the day on which

the fate of medieval Kingdom of Serbia had been decided
at Kosovo Polje in 1389 and on which in 1914 in Sarajevo
the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated which
marked the beginning of World War II.

This Serbian

victory did nothing to heal the gap between the Serbs and
their Slavic cousins in Croatia and Slovenia.

To them,

this constitution marked the conquest of the centralist
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Serbian experience over the Austro-Hungarian tradition of
constitutional complexity (Pavlowitz,

1988).

During the first decade of the life of the Kingdom
an attempt was made to operate a parliamentary democracy
based on the model which had evolved in Western Europe
during the 19th century.

The experiment in parliamentary

democracy failed because the dominant political culture
did not support it and because the social conditions for
its survival did not exist

(Dyker,

1977).

The Serbs'

centralist conception of the state and their numerical
domination caused a radical increase in Croatian nation
alism.

Between the two world wars,

cal, bureaucratic,
monarchy,
1968).

the Serbian politi

and military elites,

together with the

dominated Yugoslav political life

(Shoup,

The majority of Croatian political parties

charged that Yugoslavia was under "Serbian hegemony."
The support for a united South Slav state which had been
considerable among Croatian politicians since the b egin
ning of the 20th century,

and which had become prevalent

among young and educated strata of Croats at the end of
World War I, almost completely disappeared.
during the interwar period,

Instead,

Croats called for indepen

dence of some kind, ranging from limited autonomy to
complete separation (A. Djilas,

1991).
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King Alexandar's Declaration and Death

The first confused decade of Yugoslav history culmi
nated in King Alexandar Karadjo r d j e v i c 's autocratic
proclamation of January 6, 1929 which dissolved the
Parliament

(Skupstina),

suspended the constitution,

appointed a new government which relied heavily on a Serb
dominated army,

and renamed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats

and Slovenes the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

While most

Serbian politicians were willing to accept,
temporarily,

at least

the establishment of King Alexandar's dicta

torship because it preserved the unity of Yugoslavia,

to

the Croats it appeared as a more efficient way of getting
them to accept Serbian-style centralism.

The dictator

ship increased Croatian emotional separation from the
government in Belgrade and then was spurred by the assas
sination of Stjepan Radic.

Radic,

the leader of the

Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljacka stranka--HSS),
enjoyed the wide support of the Croatian population.
Radic had fought in parliament for a federalist constitu
tion of Yugoslavia,

seeing this as the best way to ensure

the autonomy and protection of national entities.

His

murder on the floor of the Parliament in 1928, by a
member of an extreme Serbian Chetnik organization,
changed the political atmosphere.

It led to the institu

tion of royal dictatorship in which the normal interplay
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of party politics was suspended (Bilandzic,

1985).

This

was the time when the radical secessionist Croatian
Ustasha movement grew strong out of
faction with the regime.

Croatian dissatis

The Ustashas were inspired in

their ideology by Nazism and Fascism,

and they operated

from abroad with the generous help of Italy and Germany
(Pavlowitz,

1988).

One of the Ustasha's agents assassinated King
Alexandar at the beginning of his visit to France in
October,

1934.

The King was hoping to get the support of

the French in Yugoslavia's resistance to the mounting
threats from Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria.

There was

genuine grief in Yugoslavia when the news of the King's
death was received.

Although many of his opponents

detested his methods,

they all feared that his removal

might cause an uncontrolled disintegration of the state,
which could only be to the advantage of Yugoslavia's
enemies.

The Regency

After the King's murder his cousin,

Prince Paul,

took his place as Regent until Alexandar's son came of
age in September 1941.

Prince Paul worked on two main

objectives while holding office: defending Yugoslavia's
independence against pressures of Italy, Germany, Bulgar
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ia, and Hungary; and liberalizing the regime to bring
about a reconciliation between Serbs and Croats.

The

regent prince was careful to choose cabinets that would
comply with his goals.
ment,

in June,

After two changes in the govern

1935, Milan Stojadinovic became Premier.

He convinced the prince regent that he genuinely believed
in a parliamentary system on Western lines and that he
could effect a reconciliation with the Croats.

In that

direction he signed a Concordat with the Vatican.

Al

though Stojadinovic signed the Concordat on the behalf of
the Yugoslav government and although the Concordat was
based on the one which existed between the prewar Serbian
Kingdom and the Vatican,

its ratification was refused in

1937 by the Parliament after the Serbian Orthodox Church
threatened to excommunicate any Serb who voted for it.
The plan proved abortive, but the fact that Stojadinovic
was ready to make it was seen by Croats as a conciliatory
move.

An equally encouraging sign was the amnesty which

was granted to the thousands of political prisoners, many
of them Croats

(Singleton,

The opposition,

1985).

led by Vlatko Macek,

Radio's succes

sor as the head of the Croatian Peasant Party, was pul l 
ing its strength together.

The opposition called for a

national government to work out transitional arrangements
leading to a new constitution which would satisfy a
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majority of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
caused a wave of enthusiasm.

Pavlowitz

Its activity
(1988) concluded

that Serbo-Croat relations at popular levels had never
been so close.

In leading the opposition block, Macek

had the support of the Serbian Agrarians,
and the Muslims of Bosnia,
Peasants.

the Democrats,

in addition to his Croat

The opposition coalition made much progress in

general elections— more than 37% of the votes in 1935 and
almost 45% in 1938,

in spite of an electoral system

designed to favor the government.

In Croatia,

the now-

illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia supported Macek's
United Opposition in many districts

(Bilandzic,

1985).

In the late 1930s, both the government and the
opposition agreed on the need to solve the Croatian
problem before a European crisis placed Yugoslavia in
danger.

Eventually,

in August of 1939, the Croat Peasant

Party came to an agreement with the regency-appointed
Minister, Dragisa Cvetkovic.

The Croat Peasant Party

thus broke its alliance with the Serbian opposition
parties

(Pavlowitz,

1988).

While the Premier,

Stojadinovic, who had employed some of the "street p o l i 
tics" of fascism, was enjoying the hospitality of Hitler
and Mussolini and assuring them of his devotion to fas
cism, his regent, Macek,

and Cvetkovic were working hard

to create the conditions necessary for national unity
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(Bilandzic,

1985, p. 25).

They feared that the country

would fall apart under the growing pressure of the Axis
unless the Serbs and Croats found a basis for living and
working together.

Hence the Croatian compromise was

reached under the pressure of European events.
The legislature was dissolved August 20,
Stojadinovic was removed,
under Cvetkovic.

1939.

and a new government was formed

Prince Paul chose him because he felt

that Cvetkovic was the person most likely to win the
confidence of the Croats and to bring the negotiations
with Macek to a successful conclusion.
premier in the new government,
Cvetkovic-Macek government.
Cvetkovic-Macek talks,
Croatia

Macek became vice

popularly known as the

As a result of the

a self-governing province of

(Banovina Hrvatska) was established on the basis

of the Crown's emergency powers.

Banovina Hrvatska was

the only autonomous political-territorial unit in the
Kingdom (Bilandzic,
federalism.
governor

1985).

Thus,

Macek's close ally,

this was not a true
Ivan Subasic, became

(Ban) of the Province which covered most of the

historic units of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia,

plus

some of the Croatian-speaking areas of the Vojvodina,
Srem,

and Bosnia.
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World War II

In 1936, the regency government decided on a policy
of neutrality in international affairs.

Such a decision

was the result of a feeling that regional alliances could
not protect Yugoslavia against the Axis powers without
adequate support from Britain and France, whose attitude
toward Yugoslavia was at best ambivalent
1988).

(Pavlowitz,

But the situation in which Yugoslavia found

itself at that time was not favorable to Paul's plans,
which were ultimately based on a Western orientation.
The Yugoslav economy was heavily dependent on
Germany; during the 1930s Germany had become the predomi
nant trading partner.
and Italy,

The growing strength of Germany

added to the benefits of the German economic

connection, made real neutrality impossible.

The b egin

ning of World War II increased Yugoslavia's dependence on
the Reich.

It made it plain to everyone how perilously

isolated and weak was its position.
grew, on 25 March 1941,
Pact in Vienna

As German pressure

Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite

(Singleton,

1985).

Huge protest demon

strations occurred in Belgrade and in other cities as a
response to the Pact.
questioned,

Although this may be seriously

the Communists later claimed responsibility

for organizing the demonstrations.

In his report to the

Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

(CPY)
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in 1948, Tito claimed that the party had controlled the
situation and was responsible for the demonstrations
which brought about the overthrow of the government and
the installation of the still under-age King (Bilandzic,
1985).

As far as Hitler was concerned,

proved unreliable and hostile,

Yugoslavia had

and was therefore to be

destroyed.

He had promised pieces of its territory to

his allies,

and had also settled on the creation of the

Independent State of Croatia
NDH),

(Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska--

although the final details were to be worked out

after the military occupation was complete.
Yugoslavia was attacked by the Fascists without a
declaration of war on April 6, 1941.
stunned,

The country was

already in a state of confusion,

out of action.

and quickly put

By the time of the capitulation of its

armed forces on April

18, King Peter and his government

had already gone into exile,
leaders in London,

leaving Yugoslavia's people to strug

gle with unsolved problems
Yugoslavia ceased to exist,
in exile in London.

soon to join other allied

(Bilandzic 1985).

Royal

although its shadow lived on

Pavlowitz

(1988) describes the end

of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia:
It had taken a world war for it to come prematurely
into the world at the end of 1918 and, however shaky
its state of health in the spring of 1941, it took
another world war to destroy the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, which to all intents and purposes came
to an end between 6 and 18 April of that year (p.
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9).
Yugoslavia was soon divided into a German and Ital
ian zone.

The Ustashas had set up a nominally indepen

dent state, the Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska

(NDH), the

Independent State of Croatia, which ended up being under
the Italian protectorate,

but after the Italian collapse

of 1943, the German control over the Independent State of
Croatia was absolute

(Tudjman,

1963).

But the fiction

was maintained that the Independent State of Croatia was
an independent state with its own army, police and a dmin
istration.

In reality it was not independent;

half of its population were not Croats,

almost

and its economy

was subordinated to the needs of German war machine
(Supek,

1983).

Its international status was not even

recognized de jure by the Vatican, which has frequently
been accused of supporting the Independent State of
Croatia,

and its government could act only with the

approval of the occupying powers
any case, Ante Pavelic,
Croatian state,

(Singleton,

1984).

In

the leader (Poglavnik) of the

succeeded in dishonoring the name of

Croatia by the appalling atrocities for which his regime
became notorious.

His regime declared that one of its

chief objectives was to "purify" Croatia of alien ele
ments,

especially the Serbs.

The number of Serbs who

were killed during the regime is not known.

Such re
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search was not allowed during the Communist regime;

the

figure of 750,000 as given by the Serbians was accepted
as official.
1991).

The German estimate is 350,000

(A. Djilas,

The political talk in Serbia still turns to this

powerful myth of extermination of their countrymen.
Today's Croatian government is compared to that of World
War II as being fascist and genocidal.
The NDH's savage policy toward Serbs, Jews, and
Gypsies served to obscure the contribution of Croat
Communist-led partisans in freeing the biggest chunk of
the territory in the western part of Yugoslavia with the
wide support of the Croatian population, who fought for
the freedom of the country and "for a better tomorrow"
only to realize that all turned against the people
(Supek,

1983).

These events in the history of

Yugoslavia, which were disguised and removed from public
eyes,

are of mounting importance today.
The Ustasha's ferocious racism in the Independent

State of Croatia encouraged in Serbia pro-Allied enthusi
asm at the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia,

and

resulted in rebellions against the Germans, who retaliat
ed ruthlessly.

On the other hand,

(1991) and Pavlowitz

as both A. Djilas

(1988) observe,

strengthened the Partisan movement.

the Ustasha policies
In the fratricidal

civil war that followed the Ustasha massacres,

in which
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Serbs killed Croats and Moslems,

and Moslems killed

Serbs, Communist national policies increasingly attracted
people from the different nations of Yugoslavia.
There were

two major

"rebellious" groups that

fought against the occupation.

Both of them had far

broader goals than "just defending" the country (Martin,
1990).

One group, a faction of a larger Chetnik m o v e 

ment, was under Colonel Draza Mihailovic.

His aim was to

build an underground movement that would take power and
restore the monarchy when the fortunes of war turned
against the Axis.

He was a standard-bearer for Greater

Serbia and for the House of Karadjordjevic.

He eventual

ly made contact with the government-in-exile and in
September,

1941, a joint Yugoslav-British mission was

sent out to talk with him.
government,

In October,

the British

on advice from Yugoslavs in London,

to recognize Mihailovic as
resistance movement.

decided

the leader of the Yugoslav

His Chetniks were credited with

many acts of sabotage which were,
Tito's Communist-led Partisans

in fact,

(Tomasevic,

carried out by
1975).

The

British and the London government-in exile built up
Mihailovic's reputation and underestimated the role of
the Partisans.
The Partisans were the other major insurgent group.
Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito and Communist
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party cadres, they saw the Axis destruction of Yugoslavia
as the opportunity to advance the cause of the socialist
revolution and to establish a new Yugoslavia on the basis
of national freedom and equality.
The Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) was established
in 1919 as a Bolshevik party.

Its communist orientation

had forced it to operate illegally during most of the
interwar period, because the regime outlawed it in August
1921.

At the time of occupation the CPY emerged as the

only political force which called the peoples of
Yugoslavia to arms,

stressing in its Proclamation of July

4, 1941 the anti-fascist and liberating character of the
fight against the enemy rather than its former antiimperialistic and anti-capitalist emphasis
1985).

(Bilandzic,

In the short period of time from Yugoslav occupa

tion till Germany launched an attack on the Soviet Union
on June 22,

1941, the CPY was prepared politically and

militarily to resist the enemy (Bilandzic,

1985).

The name of Josip Broz Tito is irrevocably connected with
the life of CPY.

In 1937 he was appointed secretary-

general of the party.

During the four years that re

mained before the Axis invasion Tito built up the illegal
Communist Party into a highly effective revolutionary
avant garde.

Its membership increased and it included

people from all walks of life and from all national
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groups within Yugoslavia.
personality,

M. Djilas

(1980)

sees Tito's

his drive and energy, and his unswerving

loyalty to the policies of Comintern as those that gave a
sense of purpose and direction to the Party which, prior
to Tito's accession to leadership, was torn by internal
dissensions and factional fighting.

When the old regime

disintegrated under the pressure of war, under his lead
ership the CPY was able to rise to the occasion and
create a national movement,

and in turn to weld the

resistance movement into an instrument of social revolu
tion

(Tudjman,

1963).

As Martin

(1990) observes,

it is misleading to

explain what happened in Yugoslavia during World War II
as the product of a two-sided struggle between the Parti
san resistance movement on the one hand and the occupying
powers and their collaborators on the other hand.
sees four major conflicts taking place:

first,

He

there was

the religious-political war launched by the quisling Ante
Pavelic and his so called "Independent State of Croatia"
against the Serbian people living in its borders.
previously explained,

As

this conflict was marked by m a s s a 

cres and countermassacres.

Second, there was the con

flict between the occupying powers and the two major
resistance forces--the Mihailovic movement, which was
essentially nationalist and dynastic,

and the Partisan
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movement that was committed to a communist Yugoslavia.
Third, there was the conflict in Serbia between the
forces of General Mihailovic and the collaborationist
"Chetnik" forces of Kosta Pecanac,
the forces of General Milan Ljotic,
governor of occupied Serbia.

and intermittently,
the fascist appointed

Finally,

there was the

civil war that the Tito and Mihailovic forces waged
against each other, alongside or within the framework of
the resistance movement.
Bilandzic

(1985) explained the social and political

background that caused such cruel fighting.

The conflict

that started in 1941 occurred in a period of historical
development of the nations and nationalities of
Yugoslavia when the relationships among them were already
poisoned.
Yugoslavia.

The conflicts were used by the occupiers of
They set the Yugoslav peoples against each

other in an unprecedented way.

Pavlowitz

(1988) states

that never before had there been physical conflict among
the Yugoslav peoples as during World War II.

Few nations

in history have suffered such terrible consequences.
Jukic (1974) blames the political leaders of both the
Yugoslav government in exile and the Allies,
procrastination,

and their

for creating all the horrors and hard

ships for the innocent people.

The ultimate blame Jukic

(1974), and Martin (1990), put on the Allies and their
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war leadership.

Both authors take Mihailovic's side and

see the switch in the Allied policy toward Yugoslavia as
the most dramatic change that occurred during World War
II.
The Allied policy toward Yugoslavia was of great
import for the future of this small Balkan country.
During 1941 and 1942 and the first part of 1943, the
Allies gave all-out support to General Draza Mihailovic
as the only leader of the Yugoslav resistance.
end of 1943,

for all practical purposes,

By the

Mihailovic was

abandoned because his forces were inactive against the
enemy and he had collaborated with them.

At this point

Britain and the United States, which had conceded British
primacy in determining Balkan policy, began to give their
support to the Communist resistance movement.
At the Teheran Conference which took place between
November 28 and December 1, 1943,

Churchill,

Roosevelt,

and Stalin agreed to support the Partisans as being the
only effective Yugoslav movement
"switch" had occurred.

(Singleton,

1985).

The

There were still formidable

obstacles for Tito's forces to overcome, but at the
beginning of 1944 it was becoming increasingly obvious to
all concerned that Germany was losing the war and that
the future government of Yugoslavia would be dominated by
the Communists

(Bilandzic,

1985).

The official surrender
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of Germany (May,
slavia.

1945) did not stop the killing in Yugo

Thousand of Croats and Slovenes who were r e 

treating with the Germans were rounded up by the British
forces in Austria and brought back to Yugoslavia, where
many of them were murdered by victorious Partisans
(Singleton,

1985).

This part of Yugoslav history was

kept in secret until the late 1980s.
about the Partisans'

Then,

the stories

cruelties began to get out.

Among

the most painful experiences of that time was the exodus
of Croatian soldiers and people, many of whom were guilty
of only being in the path of the war.

These people were

following Pavelic and the government of the Independent
State of Croatia to hoped-for safety in the British zone
of Austria after German capitulation.

They were driven

back to Yugoslavia from Italian and Austrian camps along
what is now known as the "Bloody Path to Bleiburg."
the town of Bleiburg,

Austria,

In

they were slaughtered by

Partisans and buried in huge pits

(Bereza,

1988).

The Communist Rise to Power

When World War II ended in May,
Communist Party,

1945, the Yugoslav

at the head of the victorious Partisan

army, proceeded to consolidate its power.

The Partisans

presented themselves as the sole unifying force in
Yugoslavia because they led simultaneous campaigns
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against occupiers,

collaborators,

and other national extremists

and Croatian,

(A. Djilas,

Serbian

1991).

This

campaign appealed to a large number of non-communists,
especially those who had been radicalized by the upheav
als of the war.

While the government in exile was con

templating the dangers of Communism in Yugoslavia,

it was

not able to fight for a return to the status quo before
the war.

The old elites,

or "bourgeoisie"

in Communist

vocabulary, were eventually destroyed in the course of
the civil war.

As Germans withdrew, the Communists

ascended to power.
The Tito-Subasic government,
tence in March,

1945,

which came into exis

as a result of political maneu v e r 

ing among Tito, the Yugoslav government in exile and the
British government, was intended by the same subjects to
be a caretaker administration,

set up to govern the

country during the difficult period of war reconstruc
tion.
The elections to a Constituent Assembly on November,
1945, were held under a new electoral law which gave
equal rights to men and women over the age of eighteen
and to ex-Partisans under that age.

The right to vote

was withdrawn from 250,000 people who were alleged to
have been collaborators.

By the time of elections,

any

political party which was unwilling to run on the CPY
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National Front Slate had been eliminated.
prewar,

Although some

non-communist groups were permitted to run on the

National Front slate,

there were no contested seats.

Such

a discriminatory electoral law resulted in the victory of
the People's Front

(a newly formed organization that

represented Communists) with 90% of the votes cast.
November 29,

On

1945, the Constituent Assembly approved the

abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the
Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna
Narodna Republika Jugoslavija— FNRJ)

(Bilandzic,

1985,

pp. 71-80) .
The outcome of the war led to a unified Yugoslavia,
even though,

once again, there was no national consulta

tion (Pavlowitz,

1988, p . 15).

promulgated on 21 January 1946.

A new constitution was
The Constitution sanc

tioned the country's new structure as a multinational
federation of eight units

(six republics and two autono

mous provinces) based on both ethnic and historic crite
ria.

The intention was to establish balance between the

units and to avoid the division of territory with ethni
cally mixed populations.

The largest republic,

contained three elements--Serbia proper,

Serbia,

the autonomous

province of Vojvodina and the autonomous province of
K osovo-Metohija.

The justification of this division of

Serbia, besides the ethnic reasons, was that it would
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dispel fears of revival of Serbian hegemonism which
dominated in pre-war Yugoslavia

(Singleton,

1984).

Since the Communist regime downplayed the historic
memories of the nations,

the eruption of Serbian nation

alism in the mid-1980s began with the Serbs' demand that
Serbia be a unified state, with full control of Vojvodina
and Kosovo.

The division of Serbia into three units did

not correspond with the Serbian national tradition.

This

was the card to be used once the power of Communism
started to fade.
Enthusiastic Communists,

enchanted by the Marxist

ideology, were proud of their achievements during and
after the war.

Dyker

(1977)

summed up the image with

which the Communists emerged from World War II in terms
of Yugoslav internationalism,

heroism and personality.

They never questioned that intended postwar federalism
and Yugoslavism would solve the national question for
good.

That image was maintained in post-war works of the

intellectuals.

Tudjman's work (1963) may serve best to

illustrate the official picture and ideology concerning
the role of the Communists during World War II: The
People's Liberation Movement was described as the princi
pal factor of all developments in Yugoslavia during the
Fascist occupation of 1941-1945,

so that its growth

within the general framework of the Second World War
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resulted not only in the overthrow of the occupation
system, but also in liquidation of the bourgeois monarchy
and the establishment of a new federated socialist com
monwealth of Yugoslav peoples

(p. 309).

After the War

The results of the first elections well illustrated
that the CPY was committed to the abolition of all other
political parties.

There were two ideological motives

for the CPY's rejection of political pluralism.

First of

all, Marxism regards political parties as a part of a
"superstructure" of the capitalist social and economic
order whose purpose is the perpetuation of that order.
In the building of a socialist society,

the CPY saw a

multi-party system as unnecessary and regressive.

Sec

ondly, Leninism maintains that a monopoly of power by a
communist party is a prerequisite for the revolutionary
transformation of society.

The CPY leadership was united

in their belief in the need for the "dictatorship of the
proletariat," that is, their party's monopoly of power
(Kostunica & Cavoski,

1985).

The CPY believed that federalism would solve the
national question.

The Constitution of 1946 provided

each nation with a separate national unit and representa
tive assemblies,

government,

courts, anthems,

flags and
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other signs and symbols.

But, as Stanovcic

(1988) warns,

one should not overestimate the importance of these signs
and symbols because the system in general was central
ized.

The economy was under the control of the central

government and the monolithic Communist Party enjoyed a
monopoly of political and ideological power.

This system

of "administrative s ocialism," marked by the total con
trol of the CPY, distanced people from power and weakened
the cooperation that had developed during the liberation
war (Dyker,

1977).

In 1948, the break with the Soviet Union and Eastern
European Communist parties occurred as a consequence of
the Yugoslav habits of autonomous decision making and
lack of submission to Stalin, who wanted overall control
over the new Communist party states of Eastern Europe.
In order to mobilize support against the Soviet Union and
to win the confidence of the population,
"four Ds"

the policy of

(democratization, decentralization,

ation and debureaucratization) was launched
1985).

deetatiz-

(Bilandzic,

The well-known features of the Yugoslav system,

self-management and local government,
orientation and grew out of it.

reflected this

Remington (1991) charac

terized this form of participatory socialism a "utopian
a g e n d a ."
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1960s: The Decade of Reforms

Remington

(1991) described this period of Yugoslav

history as "Perestrojka the Yugoslav way"

because it was

marked by Yugoslav economists struggling with the que s 
tion of how to reform the country's still largely command
economy.

The economic boom of the early 1960s convinced

economists from the successful sectors of the economy
that the time to push ahead had come.

For them, the real

problem with self management was the ratio of principle
to practice.

Their choice was real market socialism

(capital intensive selective development)
token market socialism (Remington,

1991).

instead of
Naturally,

the

chief opponents of the reform were those who would be
left

out in the shift to

when

the division ofdeveloped and underdeveloped repub

lics

was introduced,

lics

complained that the payments which they were forced

to make

selective development.

This is

and when the more developed repub

(to the federation)

areas were being wasted.

to sustain the less developed

The reformers, who were joined

by advocates of party democratization and liberalization
in the cultural sector,

got the support and blessing of

Tito and federal party leaders.
The Yugoslav economy was not strong enough for its
big leap forward and the reform failed.
conditions,

Severe economic

the rise of unemployment and the decrease in
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the standard of living induced
population

(Pavlowitz,

1988).

rising discontent in the
The student demonstrations

of 1968 pointed at the salience of the crisis.
dents demanded jobs for Yugoslavs at home.

The stu

They objected

to the party privileges and wanted knowledge and techni
cal training to count for more than political connections
or military record.

They requested a more meaningful

democratization of party life,

less corruption,

and a

return to socialist morality.

The demonstrations clearly

pointed at the LCY as being incapable of dealing with the
growing problems in the Yugoslav society (Bilandzic,
1985, pp.

305-320).

As the loosening of central control and the

separa

tion of the LCY from the state machine gave an opportuni
ty for more republican assertiveness,
conflict was about to erupt.
product of several factors:

another grave

The nationalism was the
of the growing regional

inequalities and differences which did not correspond
with the notion of Socialism as the society of equals,

of

the growing power of the republican/provincial party
elites and consequently of the increasing emancipation of
the society from the party and from the state.

The

growing chorus of discontent from the republics came at
the end of the 1960s,

the culmination of it being the

"Deklaracija," a statement signed by leading Croatian
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intellectuals asking for the separate existence of a
Croatian linguistic and literary tradition and denying
the validity of Serbo-Croatian as an historic language.
In an attempt to diffuse these threatening revolts,

a

series of constitutional amendments that gave wider
powers to the republics were hastily prepared and rushed
through the Federal Assembly in April 1967
1985).

(Singleton,

But the constitutional changes did not achieve

the desired effect of dampening the fervor of the nation
alists.

Yugoslavism was once again forced to retreat

under the growing pressure from local, although Party,
leadership.

It became obvious that the feelings of

sectarianism had not gone away.

Pavlowitz

(1988)

relat

ed this growing sense of sectarianism with the impossi
bility of fostering anything common to all Yugoslavs
other than Communism.

Tome

(1988) saw the national

movements in Yugoslavia as the new social actors that
filled the social space vacated by the party in the
1960s.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the most vocal and

articulate demands for further decentralization, meaning
greater congruence between republic and nation; and
democratization, meaning greater space for independent
expression of social movements,
69).

came from Croatia (p.

What the political elite in Croatia wanted above

all was reform of the banking,

foreign trade and foreign
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currency system so as to implement their own policies
within their republic,

going beyond the power to veto

decisions of the federal government.

The request on the

part of the Croatian League of Communists that the money
should be at the disposal of those who earn it, rather
than go to the center in Belgrade and then be distributed
as the federation decides, was interpreted by the
Belgrade Press as a growing wave of nationalism in
Croatia

(Bilandzic,

1985).

The mass demonstration of

students on the streets of Zagreb in December 1971 ended
with the army and police moving into Zagreb and the
arrest of student leaders and the prohibition of Matica
Hrvatska.

There followed the purge of republic and

provincial leaders who were "nationalistically minded."
The Croatian crisis along with the upheavals in
Slovenia,

Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo raised the fear

with the LCY leaders that any radical change in the
federal framework would threaten the unity of Yugoslavia.
Tome (1988) observed the reaction of the core party
leadership to the crisis that ended the 1960s period of
liberation as twofold:

It severely reduced the degree of

political democracy while at the same time it delegated
greater power to republican and provincial party elites.
Thus, the counter-reform had aspects that were anti
democratic and aspects that were confederalist, although
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the confederate character of Yugoslavia was not admitted.
One inevitably wonders what was the reason behind this
process of confederation.

Tome

(1988) thought that the

reason for it was that the party elite thought it had
armed itself with the strong ideology of self-management
by allowing greater powers to federal units.

This ideol

ogy of self-management was intended to hold the country
together with the sheer strength of belief.

Ideology

became the main integrating factor which was supposed to
be capable of withstanding both political decentraliza
tion and national unity.
Developments in the 1970s proved that this hope was
in vain.

Regional party elites, paying lip service to

"brotherhood and un i t y , " used the ideology of self
management to promote their own particular political
interests and thus to create political legitimacy in
their home republics.

The party failed to apply any

mechanism that would enable it to exert an integrating
influence at a nation-wide level.

The party did not want

to give up its monopoly of power because that was an
essential part of its definition of socialism, but the
monopolies were now defined by republican or provincial
boundaries.

As a result, party functionaries gave their

allegiance first to their respective republican and
provincial organizations and behaved accordingly.

In
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their drive to become the people's party, the leadership
of LCY turned it into eight national parties.

The only

institution that could hold the country together,

the

party, was fragmented into eight independent parties.
The fragmentation of Yugoslavia into eight national
states assumed a variety of forms; besides a decrease in
economic exchange among republics,
in culture,

communications,

(Bilandzic,

1984;

Tome,

it was also apparent

science and other fields

1988).

The 1980s: An Eye Opener

The system appeared to function reasonably effec
tively as long as Tito was alive.

Through his ability to

transcend conflicts and to enforce compromises in which
all the parties assented whether they liked them or not,
Tito acted as the ultimate agregator

(Schopflin,

1985).

After his death in May 1980, there was neither the
instrumentality nor agreement on the criteria for the
resolution of conflicts.

Cross-national conflicts became

everyday phenomena.

(1988) regarded them as an

Tome

outlet used in the absence of other means to express
national aspirations.
In general, the development since Tito's death had
strengthened the assertiveness of regional structures,

as

the policy of the central leadership had continued to
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balance ethnic groups against each other (Pavlowitz,
1988).

Political tensions realized themselves in Croat

bitterness against Belgrade;

they stimulated emotional

reactions among the Serbs and brought into the open the
issue of Serbia as an unequal state; they surfaced in an
Islamic assertion in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1989).

(Tijanic,

The eighties were characterized by the overwhelm

ing decline of confidence of the Yugoslav society (Ramet,
1985) which was the result of the growing popular d isen
chantment with the party,
(Pavlowitz,
es.

socialism and self-management

1988) which did not live up to their pr o m i s 

The major cause that contributed to a sense of

general crisis was the economic deterioration, whose
roots lie in the

strategy of overborrowing, popularly

known as "buy now, pay later."
Ramet

Besides economic factors,

(1985) listed several other factors that encouraged

the growing popular discontent with the system,
political paralysis,

such as

demographic changes that affected

the ethnic balance, and the breakdown of traditional
society and the displacement of the old norms by a w i d e 
spread relativism.

These factors have also exhilarated

nationalist passions.

As Schopflin

(1985) attests,

the

party's initial analysis that nationalism would fade away
once the economic inequality was eliminated, was faulty.
The roots of nationalism were deeper.

Uneven economic
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development was, at most,

one factor among many account

ing for the survival and revitalization of nationalism.
In the mid eighties,

after numerous attempts to hide

from the public the size of the foreign debt,

the party

finally admitted that Yugoslavia was in crisis.
party,

still in charge of economics,

The

launched several

emergency programs for the purpose of stabilizing the
economy, but the failure to tackle the problems in time
resulted in serious difficulties.
The historical background should aid in understand
ing of the political messages of Slobodan Milosevic,
Serbian leader.

the

In the following chapter three of his

speeches are analyzed.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ANALYSES OF THE SPEECHES
The analyses of the speeches are based on the
researcher's translation from Milosevic's Serbian text,
Godine r a s p l e t a . (1989)

[The Years of Solution],

147; 264-271 and 274-277.
checked with that of F B I S .
this chapter,

pp.

140-

The translation has been
Thus,

the three sections of

each of which is entitled Speech Summary

and Speech Analysis, do not have individual citations for
each direct quotation.

The Speech of April 24,

1987

Immediate Context

As noted in the preceding chapter,

at the beginning

of the 1980s Yugoslavia was experiencing a complex p olit
ical,

social and economic crisis.

lems of Yugoslav federalism,
terrevolution,
ployment rates,
living.

These included p r o b 

the so called Kosovo Coun

stagnation of self-management, high unem
and the decrease in the standard of

All this resulted in frustration,

apathy among people (Ramet,

1985).

and national hatred developed.

anger,

and

Distrustful attitudes

In large parts of the

54
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public,

especially in Serbia and Montenegro,

there arose

a belief that disintegration processes destroyed "former
political,

economic,

cultural and spiritual unity and co

operation and brought Yugoslavia to the brink of decay"
(Bilandzic,

1985, p. 506).

In Serbia,

the conviction

that only the Serbian people in Yugoslavia did not have
their own state reawakened and became widespread
(Pavlowitz,

1988).

This time there was no Tito to quiet

down heretical thoughts of what was historically seen as
Serbian striving for hegemony and a centralist state.
The impulse to reform the political system toward some
sort of recentralization came most of all from the
Serbian League of Communists
This

(Hopken,

1985).

"disintegration" process pervaded all of

Yugoslavia;

it was the result of a political

(LCY--League

of Communists) decision on decentralization and strength
ening of self-managerial and communal units,

especially

after the 1968 amendments to the Constitution.

The

League of Communists was still ruling the country;

it was

just that republican and provincial leadership had
achieved so much independence that they could not influ
ence each other's affairs.

This was a general tendency

and all the republics were gaining independence in rela
tionship to the center.

In Serbia,

however,

the consti

tutionally affirmed independence of the two provinces of
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Kosovo and Vojvodina,

and the lost power of the Serbian

leadership to appoint the provincial officials, was an
emotional issue— perceived as a deliberate policy of
destroying the Serbian national state

(Bilandzic,

1985).

After the upheaval of the Albanians, who demanded a
separate republic of Kosovo in 1981,
language,

(which was,

in party

termed the "Kosovo counterrevolution"),

the

Serbian politicians became even bolder in criticizing
federal balance,

especially decision-making practices

(Hopken,

Any decision at the federal level could

1985).

be made only through consensus,

which meant that any one

republican party could veto proposed decisions or chang
es.

In order to arrive at the desired political changes,

the Serbian Party leadership started with the process of
"clearing up" its organization.

Everyone opposing the

offered changes was declared as an enemy or counter
revolutionary.

The political struggle for "building and

strengthening of unity and co-operation in the Socialist
Republic of Serbia" had began to take place in public fo
rums

(Bilandzic,

1985).

By the mid-eighties Kosovo was a hotbed of crisis
and a factor of instability in Yugoslavia
30,

1987).

Djindjic (1988)

(D a n a s , June

claimed that the seriousness

of the Kosovo crisis involved questioning of the rela
tionship between Serbia and the federation,

and the
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destiny of Yugoslavia as a unified state.
serious problem.

To the Serbs, the issue of Kosovo meant

the pressures of Albanian nationalism.
Pavlowitz

(1988),

Kosovo was a

According to

ethnic harassment and Serbian emigra

tion had been a persistent phenomenon since 1966, but the
authorities had not wanted to acknowledge them until
1981.

Then the Serbian media took on itself the task of

revealing the alleged violence,
and churches,

and the resulting exodus of Serbs.

picture was always one-sided,
Albanians,

the desecration of graves
The

all the blame was on the

and the economic reasons for leaving the

poorest region in Yugoslavia were seldom stressed enough
(Bozic,
tists,

1990).

The media depicted Albanians as irreden

separatists,

and terrorists.

Such stereotyping

only deepened the dissention between Albanians and Serbs,
and served as a good political tool.

In April,

1987, the

Kosovo Serbs signed a petition denouncing their situation
as an oppressed minority,

demanding action and warning

the authorities that they would no longer tolerate the
"genocide" being carried out against their community.
Milosevic came as the representative of the top
party officials to address and calm down the demonstra
tors .
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Milosevic as Rhetor

Prior to his speech of April 24,
(1991) asserts, Milosevic found his

1987 when, Thurow

“populist voice,"

Milosevic's career was not different from any other
careerist who joined the Communist party.

His political

position could be described as that of a hard-line commu
nist,

a "true believer"

in the cause of Communism.

On

the other side, people who worked close to him said that
this

"true believer" behavior was a pose,

used Communism,

and that he

as did everybody else in Yugoslavia,

primarily to gain power

(Engelberg,

1991).

1960, he was a staunch party activist,

Ever since

but he entered the

professional political arena only in 1983

(Thurow,

1991).

In the assessment of the political processes from
the beginning of the 1980s, Bilandzic

(1985)

saw the 18th

Session of the Central Committee of the League of Commu
nists of Serbia,

held on November 1984, as the best

example of the nature of political processes described
above.

The most sensitive proposal the Serbian party

leadership offered at the session dealt with the rela
tions between Serbia and its p r o v i n c e s .

Serbians openly

insisted on greater jurisdiction over the provinces,

and

called for more decision-making powers for federal o r 
gans, but refused to call their stand on the issue as a
plea for centralism or unitarism.

Another factor con
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tributes to the importance of this session for analysis:
The name of Slobodan Milosevic, who just recently entered
the political arena, became associated with the Serbian
cause.

Both Hopken

(1985) and Bilandzic

(1985)

cited the

excerpts from Milosevic's speech at the session to justi
fy the unappreciative response of the delegates from the
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Milosevic,

a member

of the Central Committee asserted,
We must free ourselves of the complex of unitarism.
Serbian Communists have never been champions of
unitarism.
On the contrary, we have throttled every
attempt at such a policy.
The Serbian communists
have long been saddled with a complex about unitari
sm, and unjustly so, and made guilty for a relation
ship with the Serbian bourgeoisie (Hopken, 1985,
p . 41).
Milosevic talked as a representative of all Serbs
who were tired of being labeled "unitarists" whenever
they actually strove for "unity."

Another important

aspect of this speech revealed Milosevic's pledge for a
market economy and prosperity,

that are possible only in

an "undivided Yugoslav market";

that is, where the

federation is stronger than the republics.

After stating

that "[e]very citizen can see that the Yugoslav market is
less and less united"

(Milosevic,

attacked the existing autarchic

1989, p. 30), Milosevic

(republican and provin

cial) economies of Yugoslavia by saying that

"national

economies" can realize "economic interests of nations
only ostensibly"

(Milosevic,

1989, p . 30).

After this
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session, Milosevic's name was associated with free-market
economic principles.

His characterization as an "ideo

logue of reforms" reflected his desire toward radical
changes in the political and economic systems of
Yugoslavia (Rodic,

1987).

This talk,

in which he revealed his position on the

issues at hand,

served to establish his credibility with

the Serbian audience,

and affected the receptivity of his

speech delivered in Kosovo Polje in April 27,

1987.

As President of the Serbian League of Communists
Presidium, Milosevic traveled to Kosovo Polje to explore
Serbian grievances about mistreatment by Communist-Albanian authorities,
to the c a p i t o l .

and to prevent the masses from marching
The crowd of 15,000 Serbs and

Montenegrins protested against their alleged harassment
by members of the ethnic Albanian majority,

who they

claimed had forced them to resettle in other parts of
Yugoslavia, mainly in neighboring Serbia
1988a).

(Jajcinovic,

In Kosovo Polje, Milosevic spoke the words that

changed his political career

(Thurow,

1991), and trans

formed his image "from faceless bureaucrat to charismatic
Serb leader"

(Engelberg,

1991, p. 32).

Speech Summary

Milosevic began his speech by referring to the
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events of the previous day and saying that,
speak of this unpleasant event here today,
of the police,

"When we
intervention

responsibility for this intervention will

be established."
He then turned to the character of the meetings of
the Serbs and Montenegrins and stated that "such gather
ings are not gatherings of nationalists....
gatherings of enemies."

[and] are not

Thus, Milosevic said,

precisely because these are not gatherings of ene
mies but of citizens, we must not allow the mi s f o r 
tunes of people to be exploited by nationalists, who
must be opposed by every honest man.
We must p r e 
serve brotherhood and unity as the apple of an eye.
It is only on this basis, now when brotherhood and
unity are threatened, that we must win.
Asserting that "we cannot,

nor do we want to divide

people into Serbs and Albanians," Milosevic went on to
distinguish "the honest and progressive people, who
struggle for brotherhood and unity and national equality
from the counterrevolution and nationalists,

on the other

side."
Another topic change led to his providing assurance
to the audience that
not one of the problems that you have talked about,
literally no single word about the problems, will be
omitted in reporting to the members of the Serbian
LC Central Committee; not in order to inform about
them, but in order to solve them within our societ
y's institutions.
Milosevic then turned to a discussion of the problems of
Kosovo,

stating that "Kosovo is a great problem in our
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society [and] that is slowly being solved."
"if Kosovo were the only,
Yugoslav society,
better."

He said that

or the only great problem of

the problems would be solved faster and

This statement was followed by a listing of

some of the economic and political problems facing the
country at the same time.

"Finally,

this has been the

time when anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist forces have
been more present and more aggressive."

He concluded

this point by saying that,
In solving all these problems the League of Commu
nists was not always united, and therefore could not
be sufficiently effective.
I do not say this as an
apology, because I do not have right to say that; I
simply state it.
Milosevic then turned to the subject of solving the
problem and asserted that

"unity of the LC is indispens

able. ... Indeed, with unity we can solve many problems,
almost all of them.

Without unity, we cannot solve a

single problem."
Milosevic's next comments identified himself with
the problems of the Kosovo Serbs:
Kosovo remains to be underdeveloped, unemployment is
high, foreign loans are high, exports are unsatis
factory, there are a lot of incomplete projects.
What is most difficult is the presence of a great
misuse of work and of functions in the administra
tion and even in the area of politics.
Milosevic mentioned that these matters were discussed at
the session of the LC Provincial Committee Presidium.

He

further identified himself with the Kosovo Serbs by
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claiming that the "emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins
under economic, political,

and simple physical pressures

constitutes probably the last tragic exodus of an
European population."

He compared the emigration to that

which occurred during the Middle Ages.
He then moved to assure the audience that the chang
es were underway:
I nevertheless want to assure you that many measures
in the spheres of material life, political rel a 
tions, and cadre policy change every day and that
the pace of these changes will be faster in the
coming months.... Cadre shifts are being increasing
ly carried out, legal, administrative, and ideopolitical measures are being proclaimed.
After mentioning that the members of the Committees of
the LC are not happy with the rate of progress,
serted,

he reas

"the process is accelerating and I am sure that

the pace of the process will increase even more.
should know this."

You

He then repeated his dissatisfaction:

Let it be understood, I do not intend to suggest
that we have reason to be content.... Kosovo is
still the poorest region of our country.
Albanian
separatists and nationalists have quieted down a
little.... They should know, there will be no t yran
ny on this soil any more.
That will not be allowed
by the progressive people of Kosovo, it will not be
allowed by Serbia, and it will not be allowed by
Yugoslavia.
Milosevic then challenged the position of the Albanian
separatists and offered the argument that the

"logical

continuation" of their position is "that the province
should be actually and legally transformed into a repub-
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lie, by which,
steps,

in fact,

the first, but not insignificant

are taken toward a breakup of the territorial

integrity of Socialist Republic of Serbia and of
Yugoslavia."

Milosevic claimed that "[w]e have grappled

with this problem,

and the progressive people in Kosovo,

in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia have grappled with it."
But, he said,

"some misunderstandings must be cleared."

Misunderstandings he addressed were dealing with the
conception of minorities and majorities in Kosovo.
The Serbs and Montenegrins are not a minority in
regard to the Albanians in Kosovo, just as the
Albanians are not a minority in Yugoslavia, but a
nationality that lives together in equality with
other nations and nationalities in three of our
socialist republics.
He then argued against the idea of "an ethnically pure
and economically and politically autonomous and isolated
Kosovo,"

saying that such "nationalism would exclude [the

Albanians]

from the encirclement and would not only slow

down, but it would cease their development both in eco
nomic and a generally spiritual sense."
such policy would "deprive

[the Albanians]

He said that
of the p ossi

bility to participate in the dynamic life of the modern
world."

He argued generally that

means isolation from others and...
ment" and that

" [ n a t i o n a l i s m always
lagging in develop

"we, the Communists, must do everything to

eliminate the consequences of nationalist and separatist
behavior of the counterrevolutionary forces,

both in
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Kosovo and in other parts of the country."

Milosevic

emphasized a coming together of interests by saying:
aim is to get away from hatred;

"Our

to have all the people of

Kosovo living well."
This was followed by a lengthy argument that the
Serbs in Kosovo should not emigrate,
Kosovo.

but should stay in

He appealed to their memories and tradition and

claimed that "[i]t has never been in the spirit of the
Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to give up before the
obstacles."

He noted that the Serbs in Kosovo cannot

change their circumstances alone and called for all Serbs
and all Yugoslavia to help them.

He argued that solving

the problems of Kosovo was primarily a matter of applying
law:
Now the Serbs and the Montenegrins suffer most from
the nonimplementation of the law, but tomorrow it
could be the Albanians that will suffer.
For that
reason, the introduction of the respect for law,
order, and equality is really in the interest of all
the inhabitants of Kosovo, in the profound social
and historical sense.
Milosevic then returned to the issue of emigration,
calling for changes that would encourage the return of
professionals who have left Kosovo. He argued that
progressive forces, the Communists and the youth,

"the
every

thing that is honest and progressive in all of Serbia may
and must participate in [the] creation of the conditions"
which will encourage the professionals to return.

He
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argued for a "campaign for the return of 50, then 100,
then 200 teachers, physicians and other experts,
workers,

skilled

and then the rest."

He described obstacles to returning:
Indeed, comrades, pay is low and prices are high in
Yugoslavia.
Shoes and books are expensive and it is
difficult to go for a vacation.... [It is possible]
to make our country richer and happier ... but only
under one precondition: that the forces of social
ism, brotherhood and unity, and progress be separat
ed from the forces of separatism, nationalism and
conservativism.
In this separation of what is p r o 
gressive from what is reactionary, the Serbs and
Montenegrins in Kosovo will certainly get the sup
port of many of Albanians, Communists, and Albanian
people, among whom they have relatives and friends
and their children have companions.
Here in Kosovo,
all of them have the common aim that the province
should develop economically and culturally, and that
all the people should have a better and happier
life.
All the working and honest people should
rally around this goal.
This should be the basis of
brotherhood and unity in Kosovo.
Milosevic concluded his speech by referring to the
power of the workers'

class of Kosovo, which "must be the

bearer of the spirit of brotherhood and unity,
and progress....
injustice."

Only this class can defeat the present

He mentioned that

"the LC must highly appre

ciate the fact that the people turn to it...
proof that people believe in the party.
this reason...

justice

for this is

Precisely for

the LC leadership will do everything to

accomplish what we, as Communists and as leadership,

have

assumed as our tasks."
Milosevic concluded:

"All of Yugoslavia is with
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you.

It is not a question of this being a problem of

Yugoslavia, but rather of Yugoslavia and Kosovo....
Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo!

Yugoslavia and

Serbia will not give Kosovo away!"
Speech Analysis

At the meeting before his address, Milosevic ordered
police to stop beating the people,
to beat the people!"

"No one has the right

After carefully listening to

requests and complaints of indignant people who asked for
"all that other citizens of this country h a v e , " "To live
in our own and not in someone else's country," Milosevic
delivered a speech that would later be
legendary (Jajcinovic,

1988a).

characterized as

He was able to identify

and express emotions his public was feeling at the time.
By saying,

"Comrades,

it is clear to all the people

all over Yugoslavia that Kosovo is a great problem in our
land and that it is being slowly solved," Milosevic
uttered aloud the words that were until then only w h i s 
pered.

He criticized the leadership of the Federation

and the League of Communists as being indifferent to the
Serbian issue.

"In solving all these problems the League

of Communists unfortunately has not always been united
and, therefore also could not be sufficiently effective."
He implicitly concluded that Serbia was lamenting its own
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inability to act:
satisfied."

"You, above all and all of us are not

His party vocabulary was interwoven with

emotionally charged statements which were aimed at assur
ing people that he, although it was verbalized as "wethe Party"

(but under his leadership), was aware and

understood the seriousness of the problems affecting
people in Kosovo:
the spirit of separatism and often of counter
revolution is still present in the process of educa
tion and training, and in cadre policy.
The emigra
tion of Serbs and Montenegrins under economic and
political and simple physical pressure constitutes
probably the last tragic exodus of a European p o p u 
lation.
The last time such processions of desperate
people moved was in the Middle Ages.
Feeling that Kosovo's political problems reflected
the feeling of abandonment fostered by Serbs and
Montenegrins and that these problems have become psycho
logical problems,

Milosevic touched something that was a

taboo topic for many years:
(Tijanic,

1989).

Serbian national pride

Milosevic said that

"it has never been

in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to
give up before obstacles,

to demobilize when they should

fight, to become demoralized when the going is d iffi
cult."

These words provoked in his countrymen remem

brance of their traditions of statehood and military
prowess, particularly on the Allied side in both world
wars.

This entitled them,

the majority of Serbs believe,

to a position of at least "first among equals"

in
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Yugoslavia (Moore,

1988).

This is the moment in his speech when it could be
claimed that the rhetoric of Communist ideology—
disguised in the appeals for "brotherhood and u n i t y , " for
united Yugoslavia, and for the equality of all the na
tions and nationalities in Yugoslavia,

in the struggle

against terrorism and separatism--was getting a new,
populist and nationalist connotation.

Milosevic called

on the Serbs to remain on their land, where their fields,
their gardens,

and their memories were.

By saying,

"Surely you will not leave your land because it is d iffi
cult to live there and you are oppressed by injustice and
h umiliation," Milosevic reminded Serbs of their histori
cal duties because with their departure they would "dis
grace [their] ancestors and disappoint

[their] descen

dants ."
The address Milosevic delivered to the resentful
Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovo Polje could be best
described in Graber's
statesman's,

(1981) terms as a combination of

charismatic and demagogic styles.

Statesman's oratory,

characterized by an appeal to reason

is evident in Milosevic's appeal to the Serbs and
Montenegrins to "conduct themselves with dignity....

and

not to let their misfortunes to be exploited by the
nationalists."

Milosevic presented an assessment of the
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Kosovo crisis in moderate language compared to his later
speeches,

as will be illustrated.

This statesman's style

of Milosevic speech is also evident in the fact that his
message about Kosovo was closer to reality than in his
later speeches
"I must,

(Jajcinovic,

1988c).

Milosevic thus said,

however tell you that if Kosovo were the only

problem or the only great problem of Yugoslav society,
the problems would certainly be solved in faster and
better way."
be patient,

This statement indicates a willingness to
to allow standard political processes to

solve the Kosovo crisis.
The charismatic style of Milosevic's rhetoric
becomes apparent in the emotional appeal he made to the
Serbian pride and to the Serbian glorious past.

The

charisma of orators originates from their ability to
express the most deeply felt emotions of their audience
(Graber,

1981).

Milosevic expressed this ability to

verbalize the emotions and grievances of his fellow Serbs
at this time, and for that reason he was declared "the
leader of all Serbs"

(Jajcinovic,

1988c).

The demagogic character of his speech is difficult
to assess because at the time Milosevic's primary goal
was to calm the demonstrators.
Johannesen's

If one applies

(1989) claim that demagogues capitalize on

the available social issues to advance their personal
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positions,

one can speculate that Milosevic's populist

appeals served him in his effort to establish himself as
the leader of the Serbian people.
The main virtue Milosevic displayed in this address
was the honest approach toward the issues he discussed.
Rodic

(1987) commented that in the speech Milosevic said

nothing deceitful regarding the whole political problem
of Kosovo.
Bitzer's

For that reason,

and according to the

(1981) distinction between rhetoric, which is

committed to truth, and persuasion, which is used as a
tactic to make people believe or do what the rhetor wants
them to do;

I would classify this speech as rhetoric

rather than as persuasion.
Speech Effects

One of the most important consequences of this
rhetorical event was the meteoric rise of Milosevic as a
proponent of "Serbian initiative"

(Lovric,

1988b).

The

Serbs finally found their long-desired political leader.
The power his audience granted to Milosevic was one of
the necessary prerequisites for the changes in the p olit
ical and social system he inaugurated.
observes,

audiences can be gullible;

As Andrews

(1990)

their yearnings for

solutions to their problems can lead them to believe what
and whom they want to believe.

Milosevic appeared to
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sense that his reputation would be a function of the
audience's needs,
Burke

expectations and priorities.

(1950) maintains that among the marks of

rhetoric is its use to gain advantage of some sort.

In

his wish to become the leader of the Serbs, Milosevic
discovered his populist voice and spoke the sentences
which the Serbian people wanted to hear, that Serbs must
be equal to all other people

(Thurow,

1991).

The sa

lience of the issue--the relationship between Serbia and
the provinces— made the Serbian audience receptive to
Milosevic's speech,
tions.

especially because he offered solu

On the other side,

promised actions bred fear

among Albanians,
(Tijanic,

his words and

1988).

This speech empowered both the speaker and the
audience.

For the first time Milosevic felt his power

over crowds

(Engelberg,

1991),

and the malaise-beset

Serbs finally saw in front of themselves a leader who
promised to grapple with their problems
As Rodic

(Rodic,

1987).

(1987) observed, Milosevic was not the

first politician to go to Kosovo, but the reaction to his
speech was tempestuous and immediate.
thorough;

His success was

he became the most popular and celebrated

Serbian politician

(Jajcinovic,

1988a).

He soon received

the aura of a charismatic leader (Andrejevic,
Tijanic

1988b).

(1989) observed that he solved the problem of
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legitimacy and credibility through appeals for a p lebi
scite type support from his people.

He was the first

party leader to be inaugurated as the people's leader and
not as head of the "worker's class vanguard" as other
communist leaders were characterized.
Tijanic

(1989) ascribes Milosevic's political suc

cess and his becoming the Serbian leader to the deep
changes that were taking place in the minds of many Serbs
who,

for the first time in history, put Serbia ahead of

Yugoslavia,
over Kosovo,

to the discontent with the federal impotency
to frustration with the fact that every

initiative from Serbia was labeled as a "unitarist fraud
of B e o g r a d , " and resentment of the notion,
many in Yugoslavia,

carried by

that it was sufficient to be Serb in

order to be suspected

(p. 42).

The surge of mass support

for Milosevic was also due to his programs of reforms,
which advocated an energetic approach and unity,

contrary

to the existing school which advocated "dialogue and
democratization" but which was never able to solve the
persistent grievances of the Serbian nation
1987).

(Rodic,

Milosevic astutely realized that for the Serbs

these were not the times that would tolerate sluggishness
and delicate nuances,

and that this was not the period in

which every debate necessarily meant democracy.

"Having

felt that, with the energetic nature of a Montenegrin,
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Milosevic raised the question of Serbia's self-confi
dence!"

(Tijanic,

1989).

A second important effect of the speech was its
impact on Serbian self-confidence.

The Constitution of

1974 carved out of Serbia two provinces, Vojvodina in the
north and Kosovo in the south because of their ethnic
composition.

These regions had been the cradle of

Serbdom at the beginning of its medieval and modern
development.

The Serbs experienced this as being cut

down to a size that was not too big in comparison with
Croatia.

The framers of the Constitution wanted to put

an end to what many non-Serbian nations felt to be
Serbia's domineering position,

and give satisfaction to

the minorities that lived in the regions now separated
from Serbia proper

(Pavlowitz,

1988, p. 70).

When n a 

tionalism reappeared in the form of rivalries between
richer and poorer republics,

said Pavlowitz

(1988),

Serbia, whose economic level was pretty much on the
Yugoslav average,

had no particular ground of complaint.

Her dissatisfaction was psychological.
All that
expressed pride of the Serbian nation had been
clipped back to satisfy the others.
The local appa
ratus, too close to the center on which it modeled
itself, did not provide any real leadership [italics
added].
Serbian nationalism fed on nostalgia (p.
72) .
Milosevic was able to identify such feelings and to
remove from Serbs' consciousness the burden of historical
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guilt.

In his rhetoric he chose to exchange it with the

thesis of "victimization"

(Jajcinovic,

1988c) and the

sense of grievance which were more appealing to Serbs and
their perception of history:

The Serbs were victims of

the Independent Croatian State of 50 years ago.
The strongest grievances of the Serbs were directed
against Tito's regime of post-World War II Yugoslavia
(Moore,

1992).

These feelings that Tito's system had

systematically cheated and oppressed the Serbs were
strongly stressed in the 1986 Memo of the Serbian Academy
of Arts and Sciences

(Memorandum SANU)

(Pavlowitz,

1988).

The content of the Memo, the criticism of the regime and
the requests of the members of the Serbian Academic
community,

Thurow (1991) asserts,

provided Milosevic with

the guidelines for action— to correct the mistreatment of
Serbia.

Serbian dissatisfaction with Tito originated

from the division of Serbia which granted Vojvodina and
Kosovo the status of autonomous provinces, while no other
republic had been split up in such a fashion.

Serbian

nationalists also accused Tito of having denied the Serbs
the primacy within the federation that they considered
theirs by right.

This they felt not only because they

are the most numerous single people in Yugoslavia, with
36% of the total population,

but because of their sacri

fices and victory in both world wars

(Moore,

1992).
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The whole rhetorical development that took place
April 24,

1987 shows that identification

(Burke,

1950)

between the audience and the speaker occurred.
Milosevic's language revealed the substance that enabled
him to identify himself with his listeners,

and his

audience found in him a long-desired leader ("vozd") who
would, together with them work toward the "united
Serbia."

The Speech of October 17, 1988
Immediate Context

The period between April,

1987, and October,

1988,

was a period of deepening crisis for the Yugoslav federa
tion.

The conditions in Kosovo worsened--the tension

between the majority ethnic Albanians and the minority
Serbs and Montenegrins did not improve under the strong
one-sided propaganda of the Serbian media (Bozic,

1990).

Kosovo and the serious conditions in that province became
a paradigm for the unsolved problems and decadence of the
Yugoslav legal, political,
1988; Lovric,

and economic system (Culic,

1987b; Tijanic,

1987).

In October,

1987,

the collective nine-member State Presidency ordered 400
members of the federal police to Kosovo in an attempt to
restore peace and prevent the situation from growing
worse.

However, the radical Serbs from the province,

the
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organizers of the meetings of solidarity in particular,
saw the sending of the police as only a halfhearted
attempt by the central authorities.

They demanded more

force to counter the alleged Albanian terrorists
(Andrejevich,

1988a).

For the first time in modern Yugoslav history,

the

masses on the streets were ruling the country (Lovric,
19 8 8 b ) .

Numerous strikes of workers were becoming com

monplace in Yugoslavia
mass behavior,

(Lovric,

198 7 b ) .

Another type of

the so called "solidarity meetings,"

presented Yugoslav leadership with the most serious
threat because they proved the leader-ship's inability to
deal with the inflammatory political situation

(Lovric,

1988b).
This period of 18 months was also marked by allYugoslav (meaning inside the leadership of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia) discussions over the reform of
the League of Communists toward a more democratic organi
zation and over the constitutional changes.

The inten

tion of these reforms was to introduce economic and
political reform (Lovric,

1988a).

This was a sign of

Communist political culture--that endless discussions and
verbose documents would bring about the solution of the
problems

(Letica,

1988).

Regarding constitutional changes in Serbia, the
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leadership asked that state security,
foreign policy,

national defense,

and the planning and development systems

of Kosovo and Vojvodina be constitutionally incorporated
into Serbia's direct sphere of control
1988a).

(Andrejevich,

These changes were perceived in Serbia as indis

pensable in order for Serbia to become "one unified
state"

(Djindjic,

1988) and as such "to establish elemen

tary law and order [in Kosovo]

...in the struggle against

separatism and anti-Yugoslavism"
297).

(Milosevic,

1989, p.

Milosevic's words expressed the prevailing att i 

tude among the Serbs that the
Constitution of 1974 prevented Serbia from taking any
actions and thus improving the conditions in the province
(Culic,

1987b,; Marinkovic,

1988a).

Such an attitude

toward the 1974 Constitution was not shared either by the
leadership of the two provinces or of the two liberal
republics of Croatia and Slovenia

(Ribicic,

1987).

These

leaders opposed the dogmatic hard line in the Serbian
League of Communists led by Milosevic and accused the
League of using the instruments of political coercion in
order to alter the constitutional order and form some
kind of "forced artificial unity under the name of
Yugoslavism"

(Lovric,

1988a).

The myth of Kosovo and Serbian unity established
and maintained by Milosevic

(Tijanic,

1989) served him
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well throughout this period.

Among Serbs he was p e r 

ceived as the initiator and carrier of the constitutional
changes that would right

"the absurd [fact] that Serbia

after many centuries of a struggle for its national
identity and independence ha[d] to fight for the basic
right to function as a state"
According to Milosevic

(Milosevic,

"the most absurd [fact] is that in

the heart of Serbia [Kosovo],

the center of persecution

and terror over Serbian people smoulder"
1989, p. 218).

1989, p. 217).

(Milosevic,

Milosevic's public discourse,

of which

the above is an example, provided him with reelection as
Presidium President of Serbia's League of Communists
Central Committee.

To the Serbs his rhetoric provided

justification for the actions he undertook in this per i 
od, actions whose dogmatic nature only added fuel to a
country already burning with problems.
First,

he took control over the Serbian media and

reduced the once respected Politika publications into
bellicose pieces of propaganda

(Moore,

1988).

The edi

tors of the media who could not ethically accept
ist dictatorship"

(Jajcinovic,

"Stalin

1987) or who opposed the

imposed view were forced either to resign or to accept
lower positions

(Lovric,

A second action was
a c i i a ).

1987b).
"differentiation"

(diferencii-

This process was officially described as a
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necessary measure against poor leaders who contributed to
the creation of "absurd" policies and against those who
opposed the implementation of the resolutions on Kosovo
and thus impeded the solution of the crisis
1 988a).

(Marinkovic,

It was also a strategy to ruthlessly remove

Milosevic's political opponents and the key officials in
Serbia so as to achieve the ideologically monolithic
structure of hii government
1992; Thurow,

1991).

(Andrejevich,

1989; Moore,

Milosevic also led an "anti-

bureaucratic revolution" which was similar to the differ
entiation policy (Engelberg,

1991).

This action was

directed towards removing leaders in provinces and repub
lics other than Serbia.

The object was to remove those

"incapable of obeying the people's will"
1989).

(Milosevic,

It was Milosevic's attempt to extend his sway

over all of Yugoslavia

(Andrejevich,

1989).

In realiza

tion of his plan, the "meetings of solidarity" played a
major role.

The "meetings" were massive demonstrations,

usually of 20,000 to 30,000 Serbs and Montenegrins from
Kosovo, who protested the League of Communists'

inability

to formulate and carry out policies for calming the
ethnic conflict in Kosovo.

They were also an expression

of support of Serbia's drive to change its constitution
(Andrejevich,

1988b).

Although there were different

views on this "street movement"

explaining its sociologi
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cal background (Lovric,

1988b),

and its necessity as an

expression of despair (Djindjic,

1988),

it soon became

obvious that in these meetings the rational social bases
were used to develop the irrational pretensions that went
well beyond the demands for the solution of the Kosovo
problem and for the institution of Serbia as a "normal"
state (Lovric,

1988b).

The height of mass rallies was in the summer of
1988.

They were organized throughout Serbia proper,

Kosovo, Vojvodina,

and Serbian-populated Montenegro.

In

the fall of 1988, at the meeting of solidarty, the gov
ernment of Vojvodina was removed.

The Slovene officials

publicly blamed Milosevic for open encouragement of the
nationalist-inspired rallies and pressure tactics which
"reminded many people of central Europe in the 1930s"
when Hitler was rising to power

(Andrejevich,

1989).

It

appeared that the meetings were used by Milosevic as a
tactic to turn the pressure from the streets into
Yugoslav political life (Thurow,
political power (Andrejevich,

1991) and increase his

1988b).

Amid the general crisis of Yugoslav society,

and of

the Communist party, Yugoslavia's only unifying force,
and in the midst of the war of words that was taking
place among the republican leaderships
1988c & McCrea,

1992),

(Andrejevich,

the 188 representatives of repub-
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lican Central Committees gathered together at the Yugo
slav level for the 17th session of the Central
Committee of League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

The

session, which was held in Belgrade on October 1988, was
aiming to unify the party and search for a solution to
the crisis

(McCrea,

1992).

The LCY Central Committee was the most authoritative
body in Yugoslavia's communist-party system.

The most

significant resolutions and decisions were issued in the
name of The Central Committe,

and they served as a guide

line for the future actions of its members
1992).

(McCrea,

The public interest in this plenum indicated that

the expectations among people were high.

People hoped

that the Central Committee at its 17th Plenum would adopt
decisions of crucial importance for the fate of the
country (Lovric,

1988b).

Speech Summary

Milosevic

(1989) began his speech by criticizing the

existing leadership's failure to address the problems in
Kosovo. He stated,

"therefore,

the question of responsi

bility for the crisis is imposing itself."

He reprimand

ed the audience not to continue their "marathon and
scletotic sessions while the citizens continue to be
poorer and poorer,

the peoples more divided, and the
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Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminated."
moved to the expectations of the Serbs,

He then

"Serbia expects

changes that are necessary not to overcome the crisis,
but to resolve it.

This is why the Serbian LC Central

Committee supported the proposed document which has the
aim of achieving the unity without which changes cannot
be implemented."
Then Milosevic addressed the need for change and
noted that

"[t]his dispute cannot be resolved in such a

way that will please everybody."

He then spoke a series

of sentences which contrasted those who wanted change
(those who wanted Serbia to have more control over
Kosovo) and those who opposed change.

These sentences

served to broaden the description of those favoring and
opposing change to a description of two groups differing
in economic status, political freedom,

and personal

power:
Those who are against changes do not want anything
to be changed, because at present they are living
well, in both the material and the political sense.
Those who do want changes are not satisfied with
their economic and political life. And indeed, some
people are in a position to change their job, some
have not been able to find employment for years,
some are changing apartments, others will retire as
tenants, some have barely enough for food, others
have two or three houses, some have been deciding
about the fate of the country for 40 years, others
cannot say what they think in an associated labor
organization without being demoted. It is not right
that some have been able to educate their children
abroad, while others have to escort their children
to the school around the corner so that they do
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[not] get beaten up or raped on this short journey.
Some people cannot make decisions about anything as
long as they live, while others cannot criticize
their boss or the system once a year without suffer
ing consequences. It is clear that the first group
is not in favor of changes, at least not essential
changes, and that the others
are in favor of essen
tial changes. . . . [ E s t a b l i s h i n g greater economic
and political justice among the peoples and people
will not receive the support of those whose inter
ests are threatened by this.
Milosevic then argued that the opposition position
was

"not attained through work and responsibility, but

through benefits,

aggressiveness,

and ignorance."

Milosevic was referring here to the ones

(both Albanians

and inept leadership) who opposed the constitutional
changes sought by Serbia.

He said that their interests

"do not have an equal position in this pluralism of
interests."

He described the opponents to the changes as

having "interests that are based on the exploitation and
humiliation of other people," and said that they "consti
tute injustice and shame.

. . . Their interests cannot be

discu s s e d . "
Milosevic then turned to a description of the eco
nomic conditions in Kosovo,

saying that the "majority of

the working people live on the edge of poverty at p r e s 
ent, and will very likely have poverty in the future."
By implementing the concept of a market economy and
"creating a unified Yugoslav market,
society,

socialism as a rich

a society that is not in contradiction to just
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relations among the people, will be possible."
Milosevic stated that Serbia

"favors changes and has

started to introduce t h e m . "

He claimed that the changes

"are connected with improvements in the standard of
living and the overall economic situation."
for changes

He called

"within the Constitution that would enable

Serbia to establish territorial,

administrative,

legal unity, which it has not had up to now."

and

He m e n 

tioned that in order to carry out these changes,

"it was

also necessary to introduce certain cadre changes."

This

refers to the differentiation program which was described
previously in this thesis

(p. 79).

He claimed that the opposition to these changes,
as one could expect and understand, has come from
those whose current material, political, status, and
personal interests are threatened by these changes.
However, it is more difficult to understand and
expect the fact that, after such a long time of
living together in socialist Yugoslavia, the oppo
nents to changes in Serbia seek and find allies
outside Serbia [Croatia and Slovenia]. The basis of
this alliance probably lies in the remnants of the
old intolerance toward Serbia caused by its alleged
hegemonism. Communists, workers, and citizens of
Serbia have always been sensitive about this kind of
intolerance. . . . [I ]f everything that we have done
so far is not a good enough argument that the Serbi
an people want to live in Serbia and Yugoslavia, on
an equal footing with other peoples and nationali
ties, then I have no other arguments. I can only say
that, at the least, it is hypocritical to accuse
Serbia of wanting to be superior because it wants to
be equal with others.
Milosevic claimed that the changes
detriment of other people,

"are not to the

republics or the country as a
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whole,"

that the changes are "in accordance with the

achievements of our revolution and the fundamental tenets
of the LC."

He claimed that this was clear to all

"well-intentioned people," and said that:

"As far as

ill-intentioned people are concerned, we do not intend to
try to change them or polemicize with them, and certainly
do not intend to justify our actions to t h e m . "
Milosevic then turned to an attempt to inform the
comrades outside Serbia who have been misled by the
media. He said,

"I would like to use this occasion to

state several facts about the situation in Serbia."
His first "fact" concerned the meetings of solidarity. He
claimed that these meetings were "held as protest against
the inability of the existing institutions.
the terror in Kosovo."

. . to stop

He defended the meetings as being

"fully in the spirit of our socialist and self-managing
system, whose essence lies in the fact that all working
people should manage society."
course,

He said,

"It is sad, of

that the majority of the comrades present do not

have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
real face of the meetings that have been held"

He said

that the meetings were in favor of "equality among the
peoples and nationalities and,

to tell the truth, against

some current leaders that people hold responsible for
mistakes in society."

He says that those opposing the
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change falsely equate themselves with the system,

"but it

is not a reason for raising the temperature and activat
ing all mechanisms of society to protect t h e m . "
His second "fact" was an attack on those who criti
cized the solidarity meetings:

"the fact that some lead

erships and individuals have issued warnings that these
gatherings are a public disturbance is sad and shameful."
He claimed that the government has not been responsive to
the problems in Kosovo and that having meetings that
disturb the public is normal and honest.

It would not be

normal and honest if the citizens of Yugoslavia were not
disturbed and if they were to sleep in peace while chil
dren in Kosovo are raped,

houses are burned, people

beaten up, graves desecrated,

two nations exterminated,

and a whole culture eliminated.
Milosevic's third "fact" constituted a defense of
Serbia's role in seeking changes.

He argued that

"[o]nly

the bureaucracy stands to lose by the implementation of
these changes.

. . . The autonomy of the provinces does

not stand to lose anything at all. This is now evident."
He claimed that Serbia
as is known, has no ambitions regarding the territo
ries of other republics, but does have ambitions
regarding the territory of its republic. . . .
Therefore, the threat to Yugoslavia does not stem
from the fact that Serbia wants to constitute itself
as a republic and to solve the Kosovo problem.
Milosevic then continued attacking the opposition
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and the failure of governmental leadership to make the
requested changes. He asserted that the Serbs have under
stood "this session as an end to a number of sessions
that did not succeed" in solving a problem that has
resulted in "the great, perhaps irretrievable migration
of Serbs and Montenegrins from their land, and for the
last genocide in the 20th century."

He complained that

he has been hearing about how complicated the problem is
for six years.

He scolded the leadership for wanting to

address other problems first:

"Maltreatment,

rape,

and

the humiliation of people cannot wait until inflation is
bridled,

unemployment is reduced,

the standard of living is raised,
is applied,

exports are increased,
democratic centralism

and the relations between the class and

national elements are discussed."

He argued that "in the

political and generally in the spiritual sense, the
people have outgrown their leadership."
Milosevic's conclusion was a direct attack on the
political opposition:
It is better for the entire society that the will of
the working people be implemented in a peaceful and
democratic way. There is no reason that this should
not be the case. The only obstacle to this way out
of the crisis lies in individuals— indeed, not few
in number— who have been passed over by time; not in
a biological sense, but in a spiritual sense. In the
absence of a program for a way out of the crisis and
in the absence of the ability to carry the program
out, they want to block everything: ideas and p e o 
ple. They almost want to introduce some sort of a
moratorium; ready to use even emergency measures to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89
introduce the moratorium. However, Yugoslavia does
not need emergency measures. It needs extraordinary
efforts and results.

Speech Analysis

The seriousness of the political situation in Yugo
slavia demanded that the members of the Central Committee
display the highest level of logic and understanding in
order to arrive to a desired solution to the country's
problems

(Letica,

1988).

According to Graber's
man's oratory,

(1981) definition of states

that particular style of political rheto

ric appeared to be most appropriate to be utilized by a
member of LCY Central Committee, because it appeals to
reasoned argumentation and clear presentation of the
issues at hand.

However,

Milosevic's address,

demagogic rhetoric prevailed in

thus implying that his intentions

were not so much the preservation of Yugoslavia,
advancement of Serbian initiative

(Lovric,

as the

1988b).

The speech Milosevic delivered to the members of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia
tee in Belgrade on October 17,

(LCY) Central Commit

1988 is an example of his

tough and uncompromising "forum rhetoric," as Letica
(1988) defines the Communist Party's official discourse.
Milosevic
Serbs,

(1989) expressed the anticipations of the

"From this session Serbia expects changes that are
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necessary not to overcome the crisis but to resolve it."
Through this speech Milosevic revealed a dogmatic
attitude toward the changes that would supposedly pull
Yugoslavia out of crisis and that he advocated so much.
He displayed irrational and ethically highly questionable
arguments,

especially in that part where he justified the

"solidarity meetings."

The whole speech appears to

justify the policies he inaugurated as the president of
the Serbian League of Communists.
The beginning of the speech is devoted to the topic
with which Milosevic became identified--the criticism of
existing leadership:

"[T]he leadership continue their

marathon and sclerotic sessions while the citizens con
tinue to be poorer and poorer,

the peoples more divided,

and the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminated."
The Kosovo myth about poor mistreated Serbs is used here
as a contrast to inefficient politicians;

however it is

an irrational argument in the pledge for the changes that
would "establish greater economic and political justice"
among the people.
Milosevic's next statement reveals his populist nature,
"It is not right that some have been able to educate
their children abroad,

while others have to escort their

children to the school around the corner so that they do
not get beaten up or raped on this short journey."

The
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Serbian media was full of stories describing beating,
rape and other type of violence committed by Albanians in
Kosovo.

On the other side, there were Croatian and

Slovenian media characterizing Serbian writing on Kosovo
as gross exaggerations of Albanian violence

(Bozic,

1990) .
Milosevic's oversimplification of the complex Kosovo
situation

(explaining it only in terms of violence and

crime committed by Albanians,

and describing the Serbs

only as victims of the crime)

could not be characterized

as what Johannesen (1989) would describe as a strategy of
an ethical communicator who should be concerned with
truth rather than with the promotion of personal or group
interests

(p. 38).

Instead of easing the tensions in

that troubled province, Milosevic's address intentionally
reinforced the stereotypes of "bad Albanians."
he did not use that term,

Although

one could not accuse him of

being ambiguous because the political context of his
speech made his message a clear innuendo.
an appeal to hatred toward Albanians,
emotionally charged talk,

The speech was

or in Milosevic's

to "[t]hose who exiled the

whole nation from its territory"
As much as Milosevic presented himself as the p r o 
moter of the changes toward a "socialist democratic
country," the evidence he presented appeared rather as
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pseudoproof.

For instance,

he refused any dialogue with

the ones who are "against changes.... because at present
they are living well,
ical sense."

in both the material and the polit

Milosevic's alleged pro-democratic attitude

was inconsistent with his hard-line stand on the issue.
He was already publicly criticized by Croatian

(e. g.,

D a n a s , 1988, March 1; D a n a s , 1988, August 30) and Slovene
media (Andrejevich,

1989) as an authoritarian and nation

alistic leader of the Serbs who used demagogic tactics
such as protest marches and rallies to promote his views
(Brkovic,

1988).

One of the characteristics of a dem a 

gogue that Johannesen
use of suggestion,

(1989) observes,

is "intentional

irrelevant emotional appeals,

and

pseudoproof to circumvent human rational decision-making
processes"

(p. 37).

The inclination of Milosevic to use

pseudoproof is present throughout the speech,

but it

becomes especially apparent in the part of the speech
where he wanted to "inform"

his comrades about the nature

of events and processes that were taking place in Serbia.
Each "fact" about the meetings,
and economic changes, was

about the constitutional

"supported" by a pseudoproof—

emotionally charged attack on those who oppose his p olit
ical position.

The attack on the opposition was done

through provocative language.

They were described as

those who enjoy a high standard of living,

"who exiled
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the whole nation from its t e r r i t o r y , " who tolerate rape
and genocide, who "attained their positions through
aggressiveness and irresponsibility."
The speech as a whole provides a good basis for an
assessment of Milosevic's ethos as that of a demagogue,
and for the claim that he was using demagogic as opposed
to the statesmanlike rhetoric.

In the dogmatic move

toward monolithic ideological unity, Milosevic did not
tolerate any dissent;

he even rejected the "pluralism of

interests" which was the only legal way to express di f 
ferent opinions in the Communist party, because,
argued,

he

it served "to protect positions that were not

attained through work and responsibility, but through
benefits,

aggressiveness and ignorance."

asserted that

Thus, Milosevic

"their interests cannot be discussed.

is what democracy is."

He explained that

This

"[t]hose who

exiled the whole nation from its territory do not have an
equal position in this pluralism of interests with those
who were exiled."

The pluralism of interests,

to Milosevic's speech,
tioned groups

according

cannot tolerate the afore m e n 

(both incapable politicians and "bad"

Albanians) because

"their interests are based on the

exploitation and humiliation of other people and they do
not represent a part of pluralism of self-managing inter
ests, but constitute injustice and shame."

Here he
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described those who did not fit into his picture of a
"socialist democratic country"

(i. e., those who opposed

his intent to impose more control over Kosovo)
terms.

in "Devil"

Once again he used the Kosovo myth as "distorted

and irrelevant evidence...
(Johannesen,

to support

[his]...

claims"

1989, p. 38).

The part of the speech that is most indicative of
his opportunistic,

and thus demagogic political attitudes

is that where he undertook the task of informing "the
comrades outside Serbia who, because of divisions in the
media are not well or sufficiently informed ...about the
situation in Serbia."

First he defended the meetings of

solidarity with Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins,
Comrades, these are held against the inability of
the existing institutions and some individuals in
them to stop the terror in K o s o v o .... This kind of
public reaction is not incompatible with our social
system.
On the contrary.
It is fully in the spirit
of our socialist and self-managing system, whose
essence lies in the fact that all working people
should manage society.
The strategic use of his rhetoric becomes apparent
when one sees that each "fact" Milosevic earnestly p r e 
sented was followed by an attack on those opposing the
constitutional changes his leadership offered.

So the

"fact" about the meetings is followed by the following
statement:
In this respect, the condemning or banning of
citizens' gatherings in our society is not accept
able. Nobody has the right to do this if these meet-
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ings are rallies for socialism and Yugoslavia and
are held with the aim of stimulating institutions to
take actions to protect and develop socialism, which
is something they are not doing at present [italics
added].
The change in Milosevic's attitude toward the m e e t 
ings, can only be explained as an opportunistic tactic of
a demagogue.

Johannesen

(1989)

characterizes a demagogue

as a persuader who "capitalizes on the availability of a
major contemporary social issue or problem"
In April,

(p. 37).

1987, when Milosevic stood in front of 15,000

demonstrating Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins,

he appealed

to them

to behave peacefully and democratically and not

to hold

protest rallies,

and that

"[they] must

not allow

the misfortunes of the people to be exploited by the
nationalists."

Although Milosevic prevented demonstra

tors to

go to the capital at that

time,

since the summer

of 1988

he advocated mass rallies

as an expression of a

"uniform mood in favor of socialism,

Yugoslavia,

among the peoples and nationalities,

and to tell the

truth,

equality

against some current leaders that people hold

responsible for mistakes in society."

Milosevic's

audience at this Session consisted of the representatives
from all parts of Yugoslavia.

His appeal to their under

standing of "the real face of the m e e t i n g s . ..[as] some
thing sacred" did not find a responsive audience.

It was

difficult for the representatives to trust him because
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the media in other parts of Yugoslavia were disclosing
that "the real face" of the meetings was not what
Milosevic wanted them to believe,

but the pragmatic use

of the discontented masses

(e. g. D a n a s , 1988, March 1;

Danas,

One of the organizers of the

1988, October 11).

meeting of solidarity in Novi Sad, Scepanovic

(1988),

reveals that the removal of the Vojvodina government was
planned and "programmed....[i]t took only somebody
to...direct the events"

(p. 8).

On their way from Backa

Palanka to Novi Sad the organized workers from Majevica
and Jugoalat factories chanted,
overthrow the government"

"In Novi Sad we will

(Paripovic,

1988, p. 7).

While

standing in front of the capital building they cried,
"Down with the bureaucrats," and "Down with the thieves"
(Paripovic,

1988, p. 8).

At the Novi Sad meeting the

crowd turned their back when the provincial officials
wanted to talk with them.

They hurled yogurt and bread

at the provincial capital building.

They stood in front

of the building for two days stipulating their leaving in
exchange with the complete government resignation.
government of Vojvodina,

which refused Milosevic's p r o 

posal for the constitutional changes,
ber 7, 1988 (Paripovic,

The

1988).

abdicated on Oct o 

The new government of

Vojvodina was formed of pro-Milosevic followers
(Engelberg,

1991).
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The slogans most often chanted at the meetings were,
"Kosovo is Serbia,"
Slobodan"

"Vojvodina is Serbia,"

(Andrejevich,

1988b, p. 8),

lives before we give up Kosovo,"
10),

"We love you

"We will give our

(Jajcinovic,

"A Yugoslav flag for Kosovo,"

1988a, p.

"A strong Serbia,

a

strong Yugoslavia," "Give us back our h i s t o r y , " (Moore,
1988, pp.

17-18),

"Hey Serbia in three parts, you will

again be undivided"

(Paripovic,

1988, p. 7).

At the

rallies the protesters carried posters with Milosevic's
photograph and sang the songs about him (Moore,
Tijanic,

1988;

1989).

Bitzer

(1981) draws the distinction between po l i t i 

cal rhetoric and persuasion.

According to Bitzer

(1981),

Milosevic's attempt to "inform" his audience would be
seen as persuading others to adopt his viewpoints

"that

are weak in conception and shallow in v a l u e , " rather than
political rhetoric which is committed to truth and value
and insists on rational justification

(Bitzer,

1981, p.

228). Bitzer's distinction may well help us understand
Milosevic's political strategies which were primarily
done through persuasive discourse.
Another important section of Milosevic's speech at
the 17th Session is that part where he talks about con
stitutional changes in Serbia.

Once again he used shal

low arguments, whose truth could have been questioned at
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the moment

(after the manner in which the Vojvodina

government was forced to resign),

"Only bureaucracy

stands to lose by the implementation of these
tional] changes,

[constitu

above all provincial bureaucracy.

The

autonomy of the provinces does not stand to lose anything
at a l l ."

Speech Effects

Milosevic,
Serb followers,

knowing the power he enjoyed with his
uttered the words that could be hardly

understood in any way other than the threat to
Yugoslavia's existing political order.

He stated that

Serbia did not have ambitions regarding the territories
of other republics, but that it did have ambitions r e 
garding the territory of its republic.
with a very ambiguous assertion,

He then followed

"Whether this territory

is large or small, depends on the yardstick used to
measure it.

But whatever its size it must remain as

such, and will remain as such"
However,

(Milosevic,

1989, p. 269).

just after the 17th session the organizers of

the meetings of solidarity staged another meeting in
Titograd, Montenegro causing a coup d'etat in that repub
lic (Lovric,

1989a).

Milosevic's actions thus showed

that his talk did not have any real basis,
ments were dishonest,

that his argu

and served as a means to achieve an
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ambitious end— Greater Serbia.

The threat to the discor

dant and to the fate of Yugoslavia was best expressed by
Milosevic in the following sentence,

"Do they really not

see that the working people and citizens in Serbia will
not accept any bans or any permits,
accept any tutors,

that they will not

especially not in matters concerning

their legitimate rights"

(Milosevic,

1989, p. 269).

statement proved to have prophetic significance.

This

The

path Serbia had chosen to follow did not allow any t u 
tors, any discussion.

As much as their mouths were full

of preserving Yugoslavia,

it became indisputable that the

Serbian view on Yugoslavia was different than the more
democratic view of Yugoslavia as offered by Croatian and
Slovenian party leadership (Lovric,

1988c).

The Speech of November 19,

1988

The meeting of the Brotherhood and Unity at the
confluence of the Sava and the Danube rivers in Belgrade
was conceived to be "the meeting of all meetings"
(Klasinc,

1988, p.

3), the crown of all the protest

rallies and the meetings of solidarity with the Kosovo
Serbs and Montenegrins that had taken place since the
summer of 1988.

The organizer,

the Socialist Alliance of

the Working People of Serbia, prided itself on organizing
the biggest meeting in the history of Yugoslavia.
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Milosevic's address was the most important item on the
agenda for the meeting (Marinkovic,

1988b).

Speech Summary

Milosevic

(1989) began his speech by recognizing the

importance of the event,

stating that

such a large meeting has not been held in Belgrade
since its liberation... on October 20, 1944. At that
time people in Belgrade streets celebrated the war
victory, and started the great battle for the recon
struction of a country devastated by the war.
He then reminded the people of the accomplishments
of "those days" because in the time of crisis

"in which

we have found ourselves, we are inclined to forget every
thing good and worthy which we have created by ourselves,
and which we have created with joy."
He admitted that the Communists

"have halted on the

road to the society we had aspired to during the revolu
tion" but then went on to assure his audience that they
could create such a society,
road."

if they "renounce that

He offered a way out of crisis:

"What we have to

do is to change many concepts and many people in politics
to make our life better.... we will do this through a
great social reform which we must carry out."
Milosevic then moved to the issue of Kosovo,
ing that establishing law and order in Kosovo was

assert
"the

most important thing we must resolve," and that this
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constituted the "most urgent task for Serbia" and should
be seen as such in the rest of Yugoslavia.

He described

the solidarity of the Yugoslav peoples and of Yugoslav
workers as their "greatest and strongest characteristic"
which manifested itself on many different occasions.
Because of that solidarity,

Milosevic averred that it was

"difficult to explain why that solidarity has been late
in manifesting itself to a greater extent,

faster and

with greater love when citizens of our own country are
concerned."

Here his implication was the negative

response of the non-Serbian parts of the country toward
the meetings of solidarity.

He charged that

"the long

absence of this solidarity with the boundless suffering
of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo represents an
incurable wound to their hearts and to the heart of all
of Serbia."
He swiftly moved then to say:
for sorrow;

"But this is no time

it is time for struggle."

followed by describing how this
Serbia last summer"
taking place),

This statement was

"awareness captured

(when the solidarity meetings began

and how it turned into "a material force

that will stop the terror in Kosovo and unite Serbia."
He claimed that
This is a process which no longer can be stopped by
any force, a process in the face of which all fear
is weak. People will consent to live in poverty but
they will never consent to live without freedom; at
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least not people gathered here and the people in
Serbia, to whom I myself belong and therefore I know
that they can only live in freedom and in no other
way.
He spoke of the battles for freedom and victories
over the Turkish and German invaders in "both world wars"
and asserted,

"We shall win the battle for Kosovo regard

less of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the
country."

In the next several sentences he described

those "obstacles" as
announcements,
t a b l e s ...

"perplexed conclusions,

confused

negotiations carried out at restaurant

a host of petty and dirty tricks aimed at

calming down people who are great in heart,
tricks cannot frighten t h e m . "

for such

After expressing once

again that

"we shall win despite the fact that Serbia's

enemies...

are plotting against it," Milosevic went on to

warn Serbia's

"enemies" that

"we do not frighten easily,

and that we enter every battle with the aim of winning
it. "
He stated that the Serbs

"have never waged unjust

and dishonest battles that would be to the detriment of
other people."

He then spoke of the power of the people

who are "at the head of this battle for Kosovo,
that

asserting

"there is no battle in the world that the people

have lost."

In regard to the country's leadership,

Milosevic said that it had "little choice here:
either head the people and listen to their voice,

It shall
or time
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will push it aside and its existence will be recorded in
history only briefly and for the bad things alone."
Milosevic then turned to the lengthy description of
the significance of Kosovo for the Serbs, and why entire
Serbia "rose up last summer because of Kosovo."

He

argued that "Kosovo is the very center of [Serbia's]
history,

its culture,

and its memory."

He then spoke of

Kosovo as "a love that is warming [Serbs'] heart forev
er."

He engaged in a lengthy defense of the

constitu

tional changes Serbia planned to introduce as not detri
mental to Albanians.

He distinguished between good and

"bad people":
[T]hat is why Kosovo must remain in Serbia. That
will not be at the expense of Albanians. I can tell
the Albanians in Kosovo that nobody has ever found
it difficult to live in Serbia because he is not
Serbian. Serbia has always been open to everybody:
For those who have no houses, for the poor and the
rich alike, for the happy and the desperate, for
those who were only passing through and for those
who wanted to stay. The only people Serbia did not
want were evil and bad people even when they were
Serbs.
He then appealed to "honest" Albanians to rally
against the "evil" part of their ethnic group—
"chauvinists"— because
they do not cause evil only to Serbs and
Montenegrins, but also to their own Albanian people.
They embarrass their people in front of the entire
world, shame it before its children and offend its
dignity.
For the sake of all this, I call on the
Albanians throughout Kosovo and say to them that
instead of the police and Army units, Albanian m o t h 
ers and fathers should tend to the peaceful dreams,
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calm schooling, and carefree games of Serb and
Montenegrin girls and boys. This is not so because
such division of care is more efficient, but because
it is more humane, more honest, and because it is
more appropriate to socialism and the ideals for
which we in Yugoslavia all strive.
Milosevic then addressed the issue of "terror and
hatred" which Yugoslav peoples always fought against,
even if it was far away,

"in Spain."

In contrasting the

fight against terror in Spain and in Kosovo, Milosevic
said that "in the fight against Kosovo evil
necessary to sacrifice lives."

[it] is not

He claimed that in the

struggle against "Kosovo evil" one only needs to "take an
oath," which the Yugoslavs had given in 1941, when the
decision was made by the partisans to protect Yugoslavia
against fascist occupiers.

The "oath" was

"that in

brotherhood and unity we will share everything,
good and the bad, as well as victory,

both the

injustice, poverty,

that we will build a new and better world."
Milosevic mentioned that a Conference of the Serbian
LC would be held in Belgrade two days after the meeting.
He used this announcement to begin the discussion of the
reform which was going to be the major item on the agenda
of the LC Conference.

The reform which "concerns great

social changes which should take place as soon as p o s s i 
ble," consisted of two parts:
changes.

economic and political

He described the economic changes as "the most

important" ones because these should "raise the standard
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of living of the entire society and of every individual.
Concerning the political aspect of the reform,
Milosevic contended that "[these]

changes should estab

lish the unity in Serbia as a republic and its equality
with other republics in Yugoslavia."

He then spoke

several sentences about the achievements the reform
should bring to the society:
care,

education,

Improve "prices, medical

and the information s y s t e m , ... contrib

ute to responsible and open politics."

Milosevic depict

ed the reform as "a great program" that could be realized
only "if we remain resolute and united as we have been in
the last few months

[the period in which the meetings of

solidarity took place and removed the governments of
Vojvodina,

Kosovo,

and Montenegro]

and here today."

He

completed his discussion of the reform by asserting that
it "represents an expression of the needs of the working
people and citizens of Serbia" and that the Serbian
leadership understood it as "its obligation to those who
have elected it."

He said that the changes introduced by

the reform "should be implemented throughout entire
Yugoslavia."

He expressed his conviction that

in the forthcoming months all Yugoslav peoples, all
citizens of Yugoslavia will find the strength to
overcome differences, intolerance, and clashes, that
they will jointly and fraternally succeed in pr e 
serving, renewing, and developing their country.
Tito's Yugoslavia is the result of a struggle, work,
and love of all of Yugoslav peoples and nationali
ties.
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He concluded his speech with an optimistic declara
tion and threat to Serbia's opposition

[Croatia and

Slovenia who proposed to discuss more democratic changes
of Yugoslav federation].

He asserted that despite the

"difficulties" Yugoslavia was experiencing,

it would not

die "at the conference table as its enemies hope."
This statement was followed by several slogans with
which Milosevic terminated his address:

"Yugoslavia was

created through a big struggle and will defend itself
through a big struggle";
our country";

"Long live socialist Yugoslavia,

"Long live free and united SR of Serbia";

"Long live courage with which we always fought for free
dom and justice";

and "Long live comrades who gathered

here at the meeting for brotherhood and unity,
slavia,

for Yug o 

and for better days."

Speech Analysis

Milosevic

(1989) opened his speech with the follow

ing words,
Comrades, such a large meeting has not been held in
Belgrade since its liberation.
The last time such a
large number of people, united by a great idea,
gathered in Belgrade streets was on 20 October 1944.
At that time people in Belgrade streets celebrated
the war v i c t o r y ....At that time, just as today,
members of all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities
assembled in togetherness.
The beginning,

as well as the rest of the speech, was

laden with appeals to emotions,

in this case, Milosevic's
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appeals to a glorious past of the Serbs.

The appeals

were utilized by Milosevic to distract the audience from
remembering his inability to keep up with his promises of
resolving the Kosovo problem and of establishing a rich
and just society for everyone

(Lovric,

1989a).

The

speech as a whole is an example of demagogic and charis
matic rhetoric, both of which are characterized as having
little concern for truth or fairness on the part of the
rhetor,

according to Graber's

(1981, p. 211) definition

of these two styles of political oratory.
Milosevic's claim that the members of all Yugoslav
peoples and nationalities gathered "in togetherness" was
ethically questionable because the majority of the people
at the meeting came from Serbia and Serbian-populated
Montenegro.

Their transportation was part of the

arrangement by the organizer of "the meeting of all
meetings"

(Marinkovic,

1988b).

Milosevic also never mentioned the rallying of
hundreds of thousands of Albanians in Pristina,
Kosovo capital,

the

that was taking place just the day before

the "meeting of all meetings" was staged (Lovric,

19 8 8 d ) .

In the biggest eruption of disaffection since 1981, the
Albanians protested the "resignation" of their provincial
leaders, because those resignations were rather imposed
by Milosevic's policy of "leadership responsibility" and
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"cadre changes"

(Spanovic,

1988).

He did not even m e n 

tion that the date on which the meeting was held was the
anniversary of the liberation of Pristina from fascist
occupiers

(Spanovic,

1988).

Having ignored the facts of

importance for one constituent nation of Yugoslavia,
Milosevic's announced pro-Yugoslav policy became criti
cally dubious.

His refusal to deal with the grievances

of the Albanians could only suggest to the Albanians that
he did not find it as significant as when the Serbs rally
in protests,

consequently instilling in them a feeling of

being unequal and second rate citizens.
In her discussion of rational and irrational appeals
of political orators,

Graber

(1981) distinguishes charis

matic and demagogic rhetoric from statesman's oratory.
The former types of rhetoric appeal to emotions shared by
large numbers of people, whereas statesman's oratory
deals with the issues at hand in moderate language and
with sound arguments.

Milosevic's charisma was already

established through his ability to articulate the needs
and ideals of his fellow Serbs

(Tijanic,

1989).

To

achieve the identification with the Serbian audience he
only needed to play on the myth of Kosovo, which
Milosevic did in this speech as well,

"The most important

thing that we must resolve at this time is to establish
peace and order in Kosovo."
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He reveals his demagogic nature through the same
tactic— the use of myth.

Johannesen

(1989) claims that

demagogues intentionally use irrelevant emotional appeals
to evade analytic thinking and decision making.

Knowing

the impact of the myth on the masses, Milosevic openly
pronounced that
[n]obody should be surprised that all Serbia rose up
last summer because of Kosovo.
Kosovo is the very
center of its history, its culture, and its memory.
All people have a love that is warming its heart up
forever.
For a Serb, that love is Kosovo.
That is
why Kosovo will remain in Serbia.
An audience whose emotions get aroused by such a talk may
be easy to persuade to believe in Milosevic's solution to
the crisis,

"What we have to do is to change many con

cepts and many people in politics to make our life b e t 
ter."

Milosevic's simplistic attitude about what needs

to be done in order to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia,
Johannesen

(1989) would describe as that of an unethical

communicator.

Johannesen

(1989) maintains that ethical

communicator does not oversimplify complex situations,
such was in Yugoslavia at that time,

into simplistic

views or choices.
The talk about Kosovo at this meeting was much
fiercer than in the previous rhetoric of Milosevic.
After accusing the rest of the Yugoslav peoples for not
extending their solidarity "with the boundless suffering
of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo...

[which] repre
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sents an incurable wound to their hearts and to the heart
of all of Serbia,"

Milosevic quickly switched to another

political tactic that Graber (1981) defines as "the use
of language to spur or guide action"

(p. 207).

This is

particularly evident in demagogic rhetoric whose primary
concern is the effectiveness of the message
1981).

(Graber,

Milosevic asserted,

But this is not time for sorrow: it is time for
struggle.
This awareness captured Serbia last
summer and this awareness has turned into a material
force that will stop the terror in Kosovo and unite
Serbia....We shall win the battle for Kosovo regard
less of the obstacles facing us inside and outside
the country.
These militant words uttered in front of 1.3 million
people

(Marinkovic,

egos of the Serbs

1988b) were feeding the emotions and

(Kruselj,

1988).

The "awareness

[that]

has turned into a material force," that is, meetings of
solidarity, were perceived by non-Serbian parts of the
country as Milosevic's tactic to increase his political
power

(Andrejevich,

1988b),

and as something whose method

of action was not to bring forward a peaceful solution
for Kosovo

(Lovric,

1989a).

Therefore Milosevic's rheto

ric did not correspond with the actions he was initiating
as Serbian party leader.
Moore

(1988) charges that in this address Milosevic

used "vague,
lations

illogical,

intolerant and aggressive"

(p. 8) that to Moore

(1988)

formu

seem reminiscent of
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the rise of fascism in Central and Eastern Europe of the
1930s.

The following excerpts from Milosevic's speech

should substantiate Moore's

(1988) assessment of

Milosevic's demagogic rhetoric,
This is a process ["the awareness"] which no longer
can be stopped by any force, a process in the face
of which all fear is weak.
People will even consent
to live in poverty but they will not consent to live
without freedom, at least not people gathered here
and the people in Serbia, to whom I myself belong
and therefore I know that they can only live in
freedom and in no other w a y . ... [W]e shall win
despite the fact that Serbia's enemies... are p l o t 
ting against it.
We tell them that we do not
frighten easily, and that we enter every battle with
the aim of winning it.... [T]here is no battle in
the world that people have lost.
The abundance of abstract words and words ambiguous in
meaning such as freedom, victory,
Milosevic's language obscure.
that in this address,
13 times and the word

or enemies made

Kruselj

(1988) observed

Milosevic used the word "struggle"
"freedom" seven times

(p.

10). His

intention was to to make Serbs feel that they are victims
and therefore should fight

(Jajcinovic,

1988c).

Against

whom and why Milosevic explained in equally obscure
language,

"Serbia's enemies outside the country are

plotting against it, along with those in the country."
This tactic of awakening the baser emotions in the
Serbs disguised in the cloak of Yugoslavism,

together

with the use of false and inadequate information,
this speech an example of persuasion,

make

rather than rheto-
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ric (Bitzer,

1981).

To illuminate this conclusion,

let

us turn to the part of Milosevic's address which could be
identified as "an appeal to Albanians."

Milosevic said,

"I can tell Albanians in Kosovo that nobody has ever
found it difficult to live in Serbia because he is not
Serbian."

The words Milosevic uttered were very much

contradictory to the reality for the Albanians in Kosovo.
Since the middle of 1987,

the Slav population

(Serbs) were given "Special status,"

in order to prevent

their emigration, while the Albanians were denied basic
human rights

(Tijanic,

1987).

The exaggeration of the

Serbian media on violence in Kosovo

(Bozic,

1990), the

projected image of Albanians as chauvinists who wanted to
take Kosovo from Serbia and attach it to Albania
1988), that was the reality.

(Moore,

Since Milosevic's ascent to

power, Albanians were treated like second-rate citizens.
By conveying,

"I now ask [the Albanians]

to rally against

the evil and hatred of their own chauvinists because they
do not cause evil only to Serbs and Montenegrins,
also to their own Albanian people,"
the existing anti-Albanian feelings.

but

Milosevic supported
His words made it

look like the entire Albanian nation was suspect

(Lovric,

1988d).
This speech was characterized as a "warrior's a d 
dress"

(Kruselj,

1988).

At the time, the speech was also
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criticized as lip service to Yugoslavism,

and one that

would promote Milosevic into a Yugoslav leader (Lovric,
1 988d).

The violent words uttered in Belgrade stirred

emotions of the Yugoslav public.

Milosevic's rhetoric

was perceived in Croatia and Slovenia as "an open threat
to Yugoslavia"

(Krsnik,

1989) that was going to produce a

ferocious intra-national conflict in order create a
country according to the desire of only one nation,
(Lovric,

1989a, p.

Serbs

8).

The Effects of the Speeches

In 1989, Yugoslavia experienced its most serious
political crisis since World War II (Andrejevich,

1990a).

The tension between the Slovenian and Serbian Leagues of
Communists was the result of the growing opposition in
Slovenia and elsewhere to the hard-line policies
Milosevic was attempting to impose over all of Yugosla
via.
Slovenes, who argued for democratizing the Party and
for a loose confederation of the states in Yugoslavia
(Ribicic & Tomac,
the Serbian block.
and Vojvodina,

1989), were constantly voted down by
Serbia, with its allies in Montenegro

had the largest block of delegates in the

party; the principle of majority vote,

the decision

making procedure in the party, was to its advantage.
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In March,

1989,

a new Serbian Constitution "that

united Serbia" was proclaimed

(Zagorac,

democratic nature of the document,

1989).

The actual

although persistently

stressed by Milosevic's government, was questionable
because the new Constitution had not received the consent
of the Albanian population of Serbia.

The proclamation

took place amid bloodshed after the Yugoslav federal
Presidential body enacted a state of emergency in Kosovo
(Lovric,

1989b).

Milosevic's critics interpreted this

repressive method of dealing with Albanian discontent as
signalling Milosevic's success in making Kosovo a Yugo
slav problem (Maliqi,

1989).

Milosevic's abuse of the party and of the federal
institutions resulted in the secession of Slovenia's
League of Communists from the federal umbrella party,
League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

the

The Serbs chose to

interpret this as an attempt on the part of Slovenes to
ruin Yugoslavia

(Andrejevich,

1990b).

The end of the Yugoslav League of Communists was
sealed in January,

1990, at the Fourteenth

nary) Congress of the League of Communists.

(Extraordi
The proceed

ings of the Congress showed how sharply divided the
federal Party was over such important issues as the
future form of political pluralism,
the party,

the transformation of

and the definition and protection of human
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rights

(Andrejevich,

1990b).

crucial reform measures,
gates walked out.

After being outvoted on

the Slovenian Communist del e 

Milosevic sought to continue the

Congress without Slovenia, but Bosnia,

Croatia, Macedo

nia, and the Yugoslav Federal Army delegations all
refused Milosevic's call and asked for indefinite suspen
sion of the Congress.

The Congress,

and indeed the full

Party, has never met again.
The Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress buried the
Yugoslav Communist party and showed the growing strength
of the republican leaderships.

The death of the only

all-Yugoslav force meant the end of Yugoslavia.
Slovenia and Croatia this fact was recognized.

In
In the

spring of 1990, both republics organized their first
multiparty elections and elected nationalist governments
(Moore,

1992).

Milosevic,

since December 1989 reelected

Serbia's State President, worked on his promise and
announced a program to establish a state where all Serbs
would live together.

In the steadfast quest for Greater

Serbia he has followed a single strategy.

Each step

began with a propaganda campaign stressing injustices-usually exaggerated— committed against Serbs, portraying
the Serbs as victims

(Engelberg,

1991).

As a key compo

nent of his campaign to unite all Serbs in one country
and create one Serbian state, he proclaimed himself the
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savior of Yugoslavia, which to everybody else but Serbs
meant a Greater Serbia and Serbian hegemony.
The surge of criticism against Milosevic left him
intact because of the huge popular support that Milosevic
enjoyed with the Serbs.

This support was shown through

the solidarity meetings discussed previously in this
thesis.

After the goal was accomplished in Serbia,

and

the provincial governments were stacked with Milosevic's
followers, the rallies turned into "meetings of truth."
The intention of the organizers was to spread the "truth"
about Kosovo,
Yugoslavia.

as defined by Milosevic,
However,

to other parts of

local authorities in the places the

meetings were to take place frequently banned the m e e t 
ings.

The prevailing feeling was that these meetings

were Milosevic's methods of intimidation,

because they

were similar to the meeting that brought about the
Milosevic-engineered coup in Vojvodina in the fall of
1988

(Andrejevich,

1990a).

In the western parts of the country,

Croatia and

Slovenia, which had their democratically elected govern
ments by the spring of 1990, proposals to the other parts
of Yugoslavia to negotiate the future of the country were
constantly rejected by the Serbian officials.
The threat of Milosevic's tyranny became serious at
the end of 1991, when the Milosevic-dominated Serbian
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government illegally took 1.8 billion dollars from the
federal bank (Glynn,

1991).

The apparent reason behind

this act was that the Serbian economy was in crisis, with
many enterprises unable to meet payrolls,

and Milosevic

had finally consented to hold elections in Serbia.
Milosevic was successful in that he won the election,
with the other republics unable to block him, but the
piracy of the federal treasury destroyed all chances for
the economic reform which had been mandated by the feder
al government,

under Ante Markovic,

Western lending agencies

at the behest of

(Andrejevich,

1991).

It illus

trated as well the impotence of any federal institutions
in the face of Serbian determination.
The next ominous event was the constitutional crisis
caused by the Serbs when they blocked a Croat from taking
a position of President of the Yugoslav Collective
Presidency as decreed by the constitutional rota.

The

stated reason behind their abuse of the federal institu
tion was that the Croats were fascists and secessionists
who aimed to destroy Yugoslavia.
In the summer of 1991,
to secede.

Slovenia and Croatia decided

These decisions were the outcome of the

referendums each republic held in order to stay within
Yugoslavia or assume independence.

The Yugoslav Army,

whose officer corps was constituted mainly

(an estimated
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80%) of Serbs and Montenegrins, moved to Slovenia to
"protect Yugoslavia" at the time when Yugoslavia had long
lost its legitimacy.
Encountering fierce resistance,
pull back, to Croatia,

the Army agreed to

only to start another war.

The

issue of "maltreated Serbs" provided a cause to fight,
actually to gain the exaggerated amount of Croatian
territory supposedly inhabited by the Serbian majority.
After a long and tragically unequal war, which resulted
in the destruction of ancient cities and cultural m o n u 
ments,

the world finally recognized the Serbian forces

disguised in the Yugoslav Army as the aggressor.
22,

On May

1992, the Organization of the United Nations recog

nized Croatia,

Slovenia,

and Bosnia and Herzegovina as

independent members of the UN.

That act was followed by

the discussion in the European Community and the UN
Security Council to impose economic sanctions on Serbia
(The New York T i m e s . 1 9 9 2 b ) .
The death toll of the Serbian "struggle" against its
imagined enemies and for the Greater Serbia is increasing
every day.

From Croatia the Army moved to Bosnia and

Herzegovina where it has effected the worst destruction
and refugee crisis of Europe since World War II.
The Serbs,

led by Milosevic,

attempted to deceive

the world by proclaiming that they were establishing the
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"Third Yugoslavia."

The issue of the borders of the

so-called new Yugoslavia remains a mystery because the
Serbian forces are still fighting to keep and expand the
territories they have occupied in Croatia and in Bosnia.
The leadership of the new Yugoslavia does not distinguish
itself from those who are working to extend the borders
and to realize the historical map of Greater Serbia.
Control over the Serbian inhabited border regions of
Croatia would enable Serbia to realize the age-long dream
of Great Serbia.

It now includes over one third of

Croatian territory, much of which formerly was not
Serbian inhabited.
Bosnia,

Serbian reach has extended into

seizing an estimated 60-70 percent of Bosnian

territory.

In both cases Serbian militia units and the

Federal Army have expelled non-Serbs,

creating ethnical-

ly-pure Serbian areas and enabling them to claim yet more
territory (The New York T i m e s . 19 9 2 a ) .
This war showed that Yugoslavia as a state had lost
legitimacy in all of its constituent parts but in Serbia
and Montenegro.

In the 1991 referendums in Croatia and

Slovenia 95% of the voters chose to declare independence.
This war can also be viewed as a political struggle
to preserve the privileges of the Yugoslav Army officer
corps and keep the present hard-line Serbian Communist
leader,

Slobodan Milosevic,

in power

(Glynn,

1991).
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Under the Communists, the Serbs were the privileged class
in almost all the republics.

They held down a dispropor

tionate number of jobs in the military, police, bureau
cracy, and government, with their primary loyalties in
many cases being more to Belgrade than the republics they
inhabited (Cuvalo,

1990).

In the republican and provin

cial communist party units Serbs were dramatically over
represented in terms of membership
1991).

(Slobodni T i e d n i k .

Accusations have been made,

politicians and analysts,

even by Serbian

that the Army brass were p r i 

marily intent on preserving their financial base and
lavish lifestyles which would disappear without Croatian
and Slovene tax revenues because the remaining republics
were in economic collapse

(Glynn,

1991).

Although this is the bloodiest conflict in Europe
since the Second World War,
resolved thus far:

there is one thing it has

The state of Yugoslavia cannot exist

as projected by the Serbian leadership under Slobodan
Milosevic,

as a state where human rights are granted only

to one people.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Moore (1992) and Engelberg (1991), prominent ana
lysts of the Yugoslav conflict, maintain that the civil
war that started June 26,

1991, was in many ways the

logical outcome of Milosevic's policies.

When the author

began writing on this topic the term civil war was appli
cable, because Slovenia and Croatia,

although established

nations, were still under Yugoslav sovereignty.

The

declaration of independence proclaimed by Slovenia and
Croatia on June 25, 1991,

served as an immediate cause

for Milosevic and the Serbian-dominated Army to attack
independence-seeking republics.

In the process these

republics earned international recognition as of January
1992.

Hence, the term of a civil war became inaccurate;

the conflict, which already developed into a full-scale
war, became recognized as such.
In an attempt to present one of the ways in which
Milosevic's policies influenced the outbreak of the war
in the former Yugoslavia,

this study turned to

Milosevic's political rhetoric.

The speeches analyzed

121

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
are conceived to give some sense of how the tactical use
of appeals and arguments by a politician can stir p e o 
ple's emotions and guide them to desired actions

(Graber,

1981).
In Tetlock and Suedfeld's

(1988) study of integra

tive complexity coding of verbal behavior,

the work of

Suedfeld and Rank from 1976 is cited as an empirical
example of how different revolutionary leaders changed
the level of complexity of their rhetoric in response to
changes in the environment.

Suedfeld and Rank concluded

that revolutionary leaders used low level of complexity
while rallying for support.

Once their movement was

established in power, due to the changes in the social
environment,

their rhetoric reflected a higher level of

complexity (Tetlock & Suedfeld,

1988).

The level of integrative complexity refers to the
number of variables and dimensions that a rhetor takes
into consideration in the assessment and interpretation
of the issues at hand.

The low level of integrative

complexity means that the events are interpreted through
a "simplifying filter" that places events into v a l u e 
laden, good-bad categories.

High level of complexity

refers to the recognition of a multitude of factors that
influence existing problems.

A rhetor high in complexity

level recognizes that there are alternatives to be taken
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into account in problem-solving processes as well
(Tetlock & Suedfeld,

1988).

The speeches analyzed in this study show that
Milosevic's phenomenon of a rhetor is quite peculiar.
the speech of April 24,

In

1987, Milosevic spoke as a p o l i 

tician already established in power.

The speech he

delivered at the time revealed that he recognized Kosovo
as a multi-faceted problem.

His rhetoric contained a

high level of complexity in assessing the problem.
recognized that political,

economic,

He

and social factors

were a source of a difficulties in Kosovo,

together with

the Albanian nationalism.
The later speches,

however,

showed the drastic

switch in his rhetorical style in regard to the level of
complexity.

One can argue that once Milosevic assumed

the role of a spokesman for the Serbs

(McCrea,

1992),

which transpired as a consequence of the speech in Kosovo
Polje in April 24 1987, that he also assumed the role of
a leader of a Serbian national movement.

Such a conclu

sion may be drawn from the content of the speeches deliv
ered in October 17, and November 19,
dresses revealed that Milosevic,

1988.

These a d 

even though a Communist

official and thus part of the political establishment,
used the most suspected forms of appeal,
Serbian nationalism.

an appeal to

The decrease in the level of com-
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plexity reflected the change in his rhetorical style.
This change toward a simplistic attitude and interpreta
tion of the issues

(e. g . , Kosovo problem seen solely as

a result of Albanian nationalism and terrorism) does not
correspond with the conclusion of Suedfeld and Rank from
1976 that,

once established in power, political leaders

usually change their rhetoric to a more complex integra
tive mode

(Tetlock & Suedfeld,

1988, p. 51).

On the

other hand, the switch in Milosevic's rhetorical style
may be viewed as result of the demands of his audience, t
which the mentioned study maintained was the major reason
for the modification of the complexity level in the
rhetoric of the lead e r s .
A regular use of historical myths and symbols re
flected Milosevic's ability to harness the frustrations
instilled in Serbs in post-World War II Yugoslavia
(Moore,

1992).

His phenomenon is even more interesting

in the fact that his "rhetoric

[did] serve the art of

politics," as Aristotle originally defined rhetoric.
However,

rhetoric in politics can serve good and bad ends

(Bitzer,

1981., p. 233).

Milosevic's use of political language served bad
ends.

He never realized the plan, always presented in

his rhetoric,

to establish a market economy that would

create prosperity.

But he did work on fulfilling the
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promise of establishing a Serbian state.

This he did in

an undemocratic way and at the expense of the other
nations.

Always rich with hidden meanings and connota

tions, his speeches seemed to be delivered only to one
particular group,

even though he always claimed the pro-

Yugoslav orientation.
In a quest to establish Greater Serbia, the rhetoric
of Milosevic,

Serbian long-wanted leader, played one of

the most important roles.

Thurow (1991) maintains that

Serbian politics after the April 24,

1987 speech, when

Milosevic established himself as a charismatic leader,
was actually a realization of the plan designed by the
Serbian academicians in a so called Memo of the Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences, which asked that the p olit
ical inferiority of Serbia be removed.

That was the

centerpiece theme in Milosevic's rhetoric which secured
him the position of Serbian president in 1990.

In that

role Milosevic and his supporters constantly blocked the
work of the Yugoslav presidential body by refusing to
discuss the critical issues on the future of the Yugoslav
federation with Slovenia and Croatia.

Croatian and

Slovene democratically elected governments

(in spring of

1990) offered the project of a looser Confederate state,
but did not find positive response on the Serbian part.
The fear of Serbian tyranny hastened their moves to
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secede from Yugoslavia, which at that point proved to
exist only with the Serbs and in Milosevic's rhetoric.
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The Speech of April 24,

1987

Comrades: before I say a few words about the content
of our discussion today,
request responsibility,
places,

I wish to say that in order to
there is no need for us to change

as a comrade said a short while ago.

speak about this unpleasant event here today,
intervention of the police,

When we
and the

responsibility for this

intervention will be established, because there was no
reason for it.

When comrade Mitar,

our chairman,

informed us about what was happening in front of the
building, you know quite well that within a minute we
agreed that order should not be maintained by the m i l i 
tia, but that you should take over in the interest of the
security of the citizens and children who were there.
The evidence that we made a good agreement is amply
provided by the fact that order has been maintained quite
well and that it was a matter of people conducting them
selves with dignity.
I now wish to say something about the content of our
talks.

First of all I want to say that we discussed how

these gatherings are assessed and evaluated here.
briefly,
ists.

Quite

such gatherings are not gatherings of national

Such gatherings are not gatherings of enemies.

Precisely for this reason,

I know that the great majority

in this hall and outside this hall think so, precisely
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because these are not gatherings of enemies but of citi
zens, we must not allow the misfortunes of people to be
exploited by nationalists,
honest man.

who must be opposed by every

We must preserve brotherhood and unity as

the apple of our eyes.

It is only on this basis,

when brotherhood and unity are threatened,
win.

We cannot,

now

that we must

nor do we want to, divide people into

Serbs and Albanians,

but we must draw the line that

divides the honest and progressive people, who struggle
for brotherhood and unity and national equality,
counterrevolution and nationalists,

on the other side.

If we fail to create and strengthen this front,
there will be no Kosovo,

from the

comrades,

there will be no Serbia,

and

there will be no Yugoslavia.
Another thing I want to say is:

be assured that not

one of the problems that you have talked about,

literal

ly, no single word about the problems, will be omitted in
reporting to the members of the Serbian LC Central
Committee;

not in order to inform about them, but in

order to solve them within our society's institutions.
feel an obligation to say this at the beginning,

I

for it

is simply physically impossible to discuss all the p rob
lems that were brought up here today.
It is clear to all the people all over Yugoslavia
that Kosovo is a great problem in our society and that is
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slowly being solved.

I must say, however,

if Kosovo were

the only, or the only great problem of Yugoslav society,
the problems would be solved faster and better.

But

Kosovo hit us as the gravest problem at the same time as
the severe economic crisis occurred, when the standard of
living drastically declined,

when prices rose, when the

number of unemployed was increasing;
political problems arose.

and also as huge

As you know,

Yugoslavia as a

country has been shaken by separatism and nationalism in
many of its parts, although by far not to the extent as
here in Kosovo.

Finally,

this has been the time when

anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist forces have been more
present and more aggressive.

As you see, many serious

problems occurred all at the same time, and therefore our
society and the LC are experiencing difficulties and are
displaying slowness in solving them.

In solving all

these problems the League of Communists was not always
united,
tive.

and therefore could not be sufficiently effec
I do not say this as an apology, because I do not

have the right to say that;

I simply state it.

In order to solve the problems we have in Kosovo,

as

well as all other problems we have, unity of the LC is
indispensable.

This unity is the most important task

facing the party now.

This demand for unity was made

yesterday and the day before yesterday by almost every
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speaker at the plenum of the Central Committee of the LC
of Serbia that was just held.

I am convinced that we

have taken a big step toward the unity of both the LC of
Serbia and the LC of Yugoslavia.
can solve many problems,

Indeed, with unity we

almost all of them.

Without

unity, we cannot solve a single problem.
Despite the many m e a sures— some of them were m e n 
tioned by you here--taken so far, and especially in the
past year, the situation in Kosovo, both economic and
political,

continues to be unsatisfactory.

remains underdeveloped,
loans are high,

Kosovo

unemployment is high,

exports are unsatisfactory,

lot of incomplete projects.

foreign

there are a

What is most difficult is

the presence of a great misuse of work and of functions
in the administration and even in the area of politics.
We talked about this today,

I should say yesterday,

at

the session of the LC Provincial Committee Presidium
which was held yesterday afternoon.

We also talked about

the fact that the spirit of separatism and often of
counterrevolution is still present in the process of
education and training,

and in cadre policy.

The emigra

tion of Serbs and Montenegrins under economic, political,
and simple physical pressures constitutes probably the
last tragic exodus of an European population.

The last

time such processions of desperate people moved was in
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the Middle Ages.

I know that you no longer need to hear

about what was in

the past,

present situation

are no longer interesting to you.

is logical.

and plain analyses of the
That

You and all of us are interested and should

be interested only in those arrangements that change
matters for the better,
which,

and that

and with good reason,

solve the situation by

you above all, and all of us

are not pleased.
I nevertheless want to assure you that many measures
in the spheres of material life, political relations,

and

cadre policy are changing every day and that the pace of
these changes will

be

faster in the coming months.

Investments are being constantly made in the material
development of Kosovo.

Separatism and nationalism have

been treated as counterrevolution.
being increasingly carried out;

Cadre shifts are

legal,

administrative,

and ideo-political measures are being proclaimed.
in the Provincial Committee,
tral Committee or the LCY,
this process.

Nobody

nor in the Serbian LC Ce n 

is happy with the speed of

We noted this yesterday at the session of

the Provincial Committee Presidium.

However,

the process

is accelerating and I am sure that the pace of the p r o 
cess will increase even more.
it be understood,

You should know this. Let

I do not intend to suggest that we have

reason to be content.

On the contrary,

Kosovo continues
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to be the poorest region of our country.

Albanian sepa

ratists and nationalists have quieted down a little.
They are counting on time,
them, as well.

and the circumstances work for

They should know,

however,

no tyranny on this soil any more.

there will be

That will not be

allowed by the progressive people of Kosovo,
be allowed by Serbia,

it will not

and it will not be allowed by

Yugoslavia.
In the political respect,

the belief is still p r e s 

ent that the demand for an ethnically pure Kosovo is
justified and possible.
premise,

This is the basis.

From the

launched by the counterrevolutionaries,

that the

Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo is a community of
the Albanian nationality in Kosovo,

a logical continua

tion follows in that the province should,

in this sense,

be actually and legally transformed into a republic, by
which,

in fact, the first, but not insignificant steps,

are taken toward a breakup of the territorial integrity
of Socialist Republic of Serbia and of Yugoslavia.
Comrades, we have grappled with this problem,
progressive people in Kosovo,

in Serbia,

Yugoslavia have grappled with it.

and the

and in

When one bears in mind

what has been achieved so far, as well as everything that
remains to be done— and what remains to be done is incom
parably more than what has been achieved— we do not face

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134
tasks and obligations, but a great party offensive whose
aim should be the material and cultural development of
Kosovo and a free and dignified life for every inhabitant
of Kosovo.
Some misunderstandings must be cleared up, nonethe
less.

Under "inhabitants" we understand all the people

who live in the province and who are not checked for
their nationality every day;

just as they are not checked

daily for their sex, upbringing,
tion,

or profession.

social origin,

educa

In this sense one cannot talk about

either minority or majority peoples in Kosovo.

The Serbs

and Montenegrins are not a minority in regard to the
Albanians in Kosovo,

just as the Albanians are not a

minority in Yugoslavia,

but a nationality that lives

together in equality with other nations and nationalities
in three of our socialist republics.
The premise about an ethnically pure and economical
ly and politically autonomous and isolated Kosovo is
impossible on ideopolitical and ethnic grounds;

ultimate

ly, such a position is not in the interest of the A l b a 
nian people.

Such nationalism would exclude them from

the encirclement and would not only slow down,

but it

would cease their development both in economic and a
generally spiritual sense,

as Enver Hoxha did with his

policy to the small Albanian people.

He excluded the
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Albanians,

a very underdeveloped society,

from Europe.

He deprived them of the possibility to participate in the
dynamic life of the modern world.
have striven toward Europe,

The Albanian people

toward a modern society.

They should not be stopped in doing this.
Nationalism always means isolation from others,
withdrawal within one's own limits.

a

This also means a

lagging in development for, without cooperation and links
in the Yugoslav area and beyond,

there is no progress.

Every nation that closes and isolates itself behaves
irresponsibly toward its own development.
the Communists,

Therefore,

we,

above all must do everything to eliminate

the consequences of nationalist and separatist behavior
of the counterrevolutionary forces, both in Kosovo and in
other parts of the country.
hatred,

Our aim is to get away from

to have all the people of Kosovo living well.

The first thing I want to tell you in connection
with this goal,

comrades,

is that you should stay here.

This is your country; your homes, your fields, your
gardens are here.

Surely you will not leave your land

because it is difficult to live here and you are o p 
pressed by injustice and humiliation.

It has never been

in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to
give up before obstacles,

to demobilize when they should

fight, to become demoralized when the going is difficult.
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You also should stay here because of your ancestors and
because of your descendants.

Otherwise, you would di s 

grace your ancestors and disappoint your descendants.
do not propose,
suffer,

comrades,

that in staying you should

carry on and tolerate a situation with which you

are not satisfied.

On the contrary, you should change

it, together with all progressive people here,
and in Yugoslavia.
alone!

I

in Serbia,

Do not tell me that you cannot do it

Of course you cannot do it alone!

We shall

change the situation together, we in Serbia and all of us
in Yugoslavia.
We cannot in the foreseeable future return the
national composition of the Kosovo population to that of
the past, but we can at least check emigration and ensure
the conditions so that all the people who live in Kosovo
should stay in their homes,
equal conditions,
fate,

that they should live under

and that they should equally share the

first of all, of the Kosovo economic situation and

afterward,

of all other situations.

This demand sounds

absurd to the ears of an inhabitant of Europe.
ridiculous in these modern times.

It is

These inhabitants

would rightly ask whether the life and work of citizens,
their security and equality,

their rights and duties are

not regulated by the Constitution and the law.
regulated when these are applied.

They are

When they are not
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applied,

they are not regulated.

In this case it is

necessary for all political and social posts to warn the
state organs and the organs of administration that they
should do their duty.

Their duty,

the duty of consis

tently applying the Constitution and the law,
interest of all the inhabitants of Kosovo.
legalize the state of lawlessness,

is in

For if we

all who are exposed to

lawlessness are ultimately endangered.
Now the Serbs and the Montenegrins suffer most from
the nonimplementation of the law, but tomorrow it could
be the Albanians that will suffer.

For that reason,

introduction of respect for law, order,

the

and equality is

really in the interest of all the inhabitants of Kosovo,
in the most profound social and historical sense.

This

is the first and most urgent matter that we must jointly
accomplish in Kosovo.
Another matter is the following:

it concerns the

return to Kosovo, particularly of professional people.

I

firmly believe that the process of emigration cannot be
stopped until the process of returning to Kosovo is
started.

The return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo

is a process.

We cannot adopt a decree and return people

by force to where they do not want to be.

But we can set

in motion a political campaign for creating the material,
economic,

labor, and cultural conditions so that those
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who left because of dissatisfaction and injustice would
come back.

Here I include both apartments and jobs,

the conditions in which this will actually happen.
the progressive forces,

and
All

the Communists and the youth,

everything that is honest and progressive in all of
Serbia, may and must participate in the creation of these
conditions.

No price should be too high to achieve this.

Usually, we say in our political language that we
are not in favor of campaigns but in favor of lasting
processes.
so alarming,

In this case the situation is such, and it is
that we must launch a campaign for the

return of 50, then 100, then 200 teachers, physicians and
other experts,

skilled workers,

and then the rest.

campaign should then become a process.

This

Only then will

prospects exist for stopping the emigration of Serbs and
Montenegrins from Kosovo.
Indeed,
Yugoslavia.

comrades, pay is low and prices are high in
Shoes and books are expensive and it is

difficult to go for a vacation.

But surely we will not

therefore leave Yugoslavia and migrate to some richer and
happier country!

Surely these are reasons for staying so

that we may make our country richer and happier.

It is

possible to achieve this, but only under one precondi
tion: that the forces of socialism, brotherhood and
unity,

and progress be separated from the forces of
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separatism,

nationalism and conservativism.

In this

separation of what is progressive from what is reaction
ary, the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo will certainly
get the support of many of Albanians,
Albanian people,

Communists,

among whom they have relatives and

friends and their children have companions.
Kosovo,

and

Here in

all of them have the common aim that the province

should develop economically and culturally,

and that all

the people should have a better and happier life.

All

the working and honest people should rally around this
goal.

This should be the basis of brotherhood and unity

in Kosovo.
I am therefore convinced that only the workers'
class of Kosovo may and must be the bearer of the spirit
of brotherhood and unity,
only the workers'

justice and progress,

because

class has identical interests and has

the least reason to divide along national lines.

This

class knew how to struggle against even greater injustic
es.

Only this class can defeat the present injustice.

Certainly the LC must appreciate highly the fact that the
people turn to it, as somebody said here,
proof that people believe in the party.
this reason I want to say,

comrades,

for this is
Precisely for

that in the LC as a

whole and in the LC leadership we will do everything to
accomplish what we, as Communists and as leadership,

have
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assumed as our tasks.
All the questions are on the agenda:
freedom,

the rights,

culture, the language and the script;

all the

questions from land boundaries to constitutional changes,
from day nurseries to courts of justice.

In this forest

of grave problems that cause both concern and anger among
all honest people of Kosovo,

Serbia, and Yugoslavia,

concern and indignation are not sufficient in themselves,
but the readiness of the people of Kosovo and of Serbia
and of Yugoslavia to solve the problems,

and readiness of

each to make the contributions and to roll up their
sleeves all together,

as somebody here said, to solve the

problems,

constitute the guarantee that the economic,

systemic,

and the political problems of Kosovo will be

resolved.

In this sense we can trust nobody else,

rades, but ourselves,

and we shall solve this.

the

com

I wanted

to assure you that every member of the leadership of the
SR of Serbia and of the SFR Yugoslavia will always be
ready both for such talks and for a constant presence in
joint actions that we have discussed.

Be assured that

this is the feeling that is present all over Yugoslavia.
All of Yugoslavia is with you.

It is not a question of

this being a problem of Yugoslavia, but rather of
Yugoslavia and Kosovo.
Kosovo!

Yugoslavia does not exist without

Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo!

Yugo-
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slavia and Serbia will not give Kosovo awayl

The Speech of October 17, 1988

In the last several years the highest party and
state bodies have been continuously holding sessions.
They came to the conclusion that Yugoslav society is
undergoing a crisis.

At the same time, the amount of

paper used to present the views on the crisis and the
measures undertaken to overcome it is rising.
"views,"

The words:

"measures," and "overcoming" are words that I

have taken from the usual terminology on crisis.

I

personally do not regard any of these terms as appropri
ate to the situation in society, because the crisis is
deepening,
zens.

thus causing dissatisfaction among the citi

Therefore,

the question of responsibility for the

crisis is imposing itself.

At a recent session of the

Serbian LC Central Committee,

we expressed the belief

that the content of this session should be the responsi
bility of leaderships and individuals for the obligations
undertaken in connection with the crisis,

especially in

connection with Kosovo, which at present represents the
very heart of the crisis.
The Communists in Serbia,
public,

as well as the Serbian

could not accept yet another session which would

establish views in connection with the crisis and adopt
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measures to overcome it if the leaderships continue their
marathon and sclerotic sessions while the citizens
continue to be poorer and poorer,

the peoples more divid

ed, and the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminat
ed.

From this session Serbia expects changes that are

necessary not to overcome the crisis, but to resolve it.
This is why the Serbian LC Central Committee supported
the proposed document which has the aim of achieving the
unity without which changes cannot be implemented.
The very essence of the dispute that has been shak
ing this country in the last few years is whether we
should introduce changes or not,
should introduce.

and what changes we

This dispute cannot be resolved in

such a way that will please everybody.

Those who are

against changes do not want anything to be changed,
because at present they are living well,
material and the political sense.

in both the

Those who do want

changes are not satisfied with their economic and politi
cal life.

And indeed,

change their job,
ment for years,

some people are in a position to

some have not been able to find employ

some are changing apartments,

retire as tenants,

others will

some have barely enough for food,

others have two or three houses,

some have been deciding

about the fate of the country for 40 years,

others cannot

say what they think in an associated labor organization
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without being demoted.

It is not right that some have

been able to educate their children abroad, while others
have to escort their children to the school around the
corner so that they do not get beaten up or raped on this
short journey.

Some people can make decisions about

anything as long as they live, while others cannot criti
cize their boss or the system once a year without suffer
ing consequences.
It is clear that the first group is not in favor of
changes,

at least not essential changes,

others are in favor of essential changes.

and that the
There are

fewer people against changes than for them, but even if
the situation were to be the other way around,

improving

the material and political position of some parts of
society,

especially if it concerns the majority,

cannot

be achieved without bringing into question or at least
limiting some other people's material and political
interests.

However, those people whose interests should

be questioned or limited will not agree with this.
is natural.

However their consent is not needed.

This
So

cialism did not come into being because everybody was in
favor of it.

Now, too,

establishing greater economic and

political justice among the peoples and people will not
receive the support of those whose interests are threat
ened by this.
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This is why LC must not allow anybody to throw dust
into people's eyes and abuse the well-known formulation
on the pluralism of interests in order to protect the
positions that were not attained through work and
responsibility,
ignorance.

but through benefits,

aggressiveness,

and

Those who exiled the whole nation from its

territory do not have an equal position in this pluralism
of interests.

Those who have put the state and their

work organization into an unfavorable position through
bad and dishonest work do not have an equal position in
the pluralism of interests with those who are paying for
this work.

To equate these interests is not democracy.

On the contrary, we are talking about interests that are
based on the exploitation and humiliation of other p e o 
ple, and they do not represent a part of the pluralism of
self-managing interests, but constitute injustice and
shame.

There is no theory or history that could justify

them.

Their interests cannot be discussed.

the changes which,

as we can remember,

Carrying out

the LC conference

delegates demanded on behalf of their communities for
three days here is also democracy.

They did not do so

that the leaderships could again start a series of m e e t 
ings to explain what was said at the conference.
was said was heard in homes,
surgeries,

in buses,

offices,

on the street.

What

factory halls,
The country that
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respects this is a democratic country.

A country that

successfully carries this out is a socialist democratic
country.
We as individuals or as a society cannot continue to
poor and to remain poor in the future.

Divided at work,

nationally divided, and economically blocked,

the ma j o r i 

ty of the working people live on the edge of poverty at
present,

and will very likely have poverty in the future.

The greatest changes should take place in the sphere of
economic and social life,

so that life under socialism

stops being necessarily difficult and poor.

By imple

menting the concept of a market economy and creating a
unified Yugoslav market,

socialism as a rich society,

a

society that is not in contradiction to just relations
among the people, will be possible.
As far as Serbia is concerned,

as is known,

favors changes and has started to introduce them.

it
These

changes are connected with improvements in the standard
of living and the overall economic situation;

changes

in political system within the Constitution that would
enable Serbia to establish territorial,

administrative,

and legal unity, which it has not had up to now.

It

would also enable Serbia to do what is the most important
thing--to stop the terror in Kosovo.

These are the three

most important and mutually related tasks which roughly
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represent the essence of our current policy in Serbia.
To a great extent, this policy coincides with the policy
which we are conducting at the level of our entire soci
ety.

In addition, this p olicy is an expression of the

political demands of the working people in Serbia,

and is

agreed upon by the leadership and the broadest public.
In order to carry out these changes,

it was also neces

sary to introduce certain cadre changes.

Some of these

cadre changes have already been completed,

some will be

made in the next period.
It is understandable that this policy of the Serbian
LC and Serbia has been opposed.
policy,

The opposition to this

as one could expect and understand,

those whose current material,

political,

has come from

status,

and

personal interests are threatened by these changes.
However,

it is more difficult to understand and antici

pate the fact that, after such a long time of living
together in socialist Yugoslavia,

the opponents to chang

es in Serbia seek and find allies outside Serbia.

The

basis of this alliance probably lies in the remnants of
the old intolerance toward Serbia caused by its alleged
hegemonism.

Communists, workers,

and citizens of Serbia

have always been sensitive about this kind of intoler
ance, because they are not obliged to bear forever the
responsibility and burden of the Serbian bourgeoisie's
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behavior before the war, especially because the Serbian
bourgeoisie's behavior was identical to that of the
Croatian and Slovene bourgeoisie, which all together
exploited the workers class of Yugoslavia.

Today I must

say, the degree of this sensitivity is decreasing,
because if everything that we have done so far is not a
good enough argument that the Serbian people want to live
in Serbia and

Yugoslavia,

on an equal footing with other

peoples and nationalities,
ments.

then I have no other argu

I can only say that,

at the least,

it is hypocrit

ical to accuse Serbia of wanting to be superior because
it wants to be equal with o t h e r s .
The currently implemented changes in the economic
and political life of Serbia should contribute to the
development of Serbia and are not to the detriment of
other people,
the contrary.

republics or the country as a whole.

On

They are in accordance with the achieve

ments of our revolution and the fundamental tenets of the
LC.

This is clear to all well-intentioned people in

Yugoslavia.

For those who are not familiar with the

essence and details, this is an opportunity to familiar
ize themselves with this.

As far as ill-intentioned

people are concerned, we do not intend to try to change
them or polemicize with them,

and certainly do not intend

to justify our actions to them.

Concerning our comrades
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outside Serbia who, because of divisions in the media
which were mentioned today,
informed,

are not well or sufficiently

I would like to use this occasion to state

several facts about the situation in Serbia.
The first concerns the meetings of solidarity with
Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins.

Comrades, these are held

as protest against the inability of the existing institu
tions and some individuals to stop the terror in Kosovo.
This kind of public reaction is not incompatible with our
social system.

On the contrary.

It is fully in the

spirit of our socialist and self-managing system, whose
essence lies in the fact that all working people should
manage society.

This reaction is in the spirit of the

achievements of our civilization and the fact that our
citizens have been able to freely and publicly welcome or
condemn events in their own and other communes.
In this respect,

the condemning or banning of

citizens' gatherings in our society is not acceptable.
Nobody has the right to do this if these meetings are for
socialism and Yugoslavia and are held with the aim of
stimulating institutions to take actions to protect and
develop socialism, which is something they are not doing
at present.

It is sad, of course, that the majority of

the comrades present do not have the opportunity to
familiarize themselves with the real face of the meetings
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that have been held throughout Serbia this summer.
is a mass, vigorous,
ism, Yugoslavia,

This

and uniform mood in favor of social

equality among the peoples and national

ities and, to tell the truth,

against some current lead

ers that people hold responsible for mistakes in society.
This is why I do not see why there is so much fuss about
demands for some specific changes in the leadership,
they are justified.

People have not been demanding

change in the system,
tenets.

if

nor they demand change in our

The fact that some officials who were criticized

equate themselves with the system and our tenets can be
their own illusion, but it is not a reason for raising
the temperature and activating all the mechanisms of
society to protect them.
Second,

the fact that some leaderships and individu

als have issued warnings that these gatherings are a
public disturbance is sad and shameful in the country in
which brotherhood and unity are,
something sacred.

Comrades,

at least in words,

do not tell me that the

Yugoslav public was disturbed about Kosovo for the first
time at noon on July 9, 1988, when the first meeting was
held in Novi Sad.

The public must have been disturbed by

the situation in Kosovo back in 1981 when it was offi
cially stated in the SFR Yugoslavia that counterrevolu
tion was occuring place there.

The Yugoslav public
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should not have had a single peaceful day or night since
the Ninth LCY Central Committee,

because of the suffering

of their fellow citizens in Kosovo.

At that session they

heard a great many details about suffering.

Yugoslav

Communists promised at that session that they would
jointly eliminate the counterrevolution.

Therefore,

disturbing the public is normal and honest.

It would not

be normal and honest if the citizens of Yugoslavia were
not disturbed and if they were to sleep in peace while
children in Kosovo are raped,

houses are burned, people

beaten up, graves desecrated,

two nations exterminated,

and a whole culture eliminated.
Third, the essence of the resistance of some leader
ships and individuals to political changes in Serbia,
above all,

is connected with constitutional changes.

Only the bureaucracy stands to lose by the implementation
of these changes,

above all provincial bureaucracy.

The

autonomy of the provinces does not stand to lose anything
at all.

This is now evident.

However,

in an attempt to

protect their positions,

they tried to block these chang

es in the constitution.

They have even resorted to

taking from its intellectual moth-balls the warning that
there is the danger of an alleged Great Serbia.
Comrades,

I must state right now that Serbia, as is

known, has no ambitions regarding the territories of
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other republics,

but does have ambitions

territory of its republic.

regarding the

Whether this territory is

large or small depends on the yardstick used to measure
it.

But whatever its size,

will remain as such.
from every republic,

it must remain as such, and

In this,

Serbia expects support

just as it is itself ready to p r o 

vide this kind of support to others, which it has always
done, after all,

in similar situations, when other repub

lics were concerned.

In that respect,

the support given

by the LCY Central Committee Presidium represents a great
step forward.

Therefore,

the threat to Yugoslavia does

not stem from the fact that Serbia wants to constitute
itself as a republic and to solve the Kosovo problem.
Nonetheless,

I propose that all those who want to oppose

this ask themselves whether they have a picture of who
should or should not allow Serbia to constitute itself as
a republic.

Do they really not see that the working

people and citizens in Serbia will not accept any bans or
any permits,

that they will not accept any tutors,

espe

cially not in matters concerning their legitimate rights?
In Serbia we have all understood this session as an end
to a number of sessions that did not succeed in putting
on their agenda the responsibility for the endangering of
human rights in Kosovo and for the great, perhaps irre
trievable migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from their
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land, and for the last genocide in the 20th century.
Many, virtually all, who speak about Kosovo accept
that the situation is difficult,

but they are swift to

warn that such a situation cannot be done away with
overnight.

I have been hearing these words for six

years, and I ask myself:

Should we call for assistance

from world and Yugoslav geographers, meteorologists,

and

astronomers to investigate a night that has lasted six
years?

The longest night known to science lasts six

months in the polar regions.

Blocking or slowing down

the constitutional changes in Serbia and delays in stop
ping the terrorism in Kosovo has held our mobilization in
a deadlock,

and at the same time it demobilizes our joint

forces for solving the crisis and implementing the direly
necessary economic reform.
Kosovo is not a cause but a consequence of the
crisis of Yugoslav society.

But the fact that it is a

consequence does not mean that it should be solved at the
very end.

Maltreatment,

rape, and the humiliation of

people cannot wait until inflation is bridled, unemploy
ment is reduced,
living is raised,

exports are increased,

the standard of

democratic centralism is applied,

and

the relations between the class and national elements are
discussed.

The crisis is such that one can get out of it

by means of a great cadre renewal in key party,

state,
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economic,

and cultural positions;

that is indispensable

for the purpose of implementing the socioeconomic reform
of Yugoslav society as a whole.
The greatest number of Communists and citizens of
our country are aware of this sequence of m o v e s .

Their

awareness has' obviously developed more quickly and more
progressively than the awareness of a part of the leader
ship.

At this moment,

I think that,

in the political and

generally in the spiritual sense, the people have out
grown their leadership.
Considering that in our country,

socialist and self-

managing as it is, there is no interest and no will that
is senior to the interest and the will of the working
people,

and especially the workers'

class.

I think that

all aspects of these interests and this will must be
respected,

even in making changes in leaderships when the

working people and the workers'

class consider that their

interests are inadequately expressed.

It is better for

the entire society that the will of the working people be
implemented in a peaceful and democratic way.

There is no

reason that this should not be the case. The only obsta
cle to this way out of the crisis lies in individuals —
indeed,

not few in number— who have been passed over by

time; not in a biological sense, but in a spiritual
sense.

In the absence of a program for a way out of the
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crisis and in the absence of the ability to carry the
program out, they want to block everything:
people.

ideas and

They almost want to introduce some sort of a

moratorium;

ready to use even emergency measures to

introduce the moratorium.
need emergency measures.

However,

Yugoslavia does not

It needs extraordinary efforts

and results.

The Speech of November 19,

Comrades,

1988

such a large meeting has not been held in

Belgrade since its liberation.
large number of people,

The last time such a

united by a great idea gathered

in Belgrade streets was on October 20,

1944.

At that

time people in Belgrade streets celebrated the war
victory,

and started the great battle for the reconstruc

tion of a country devastated by the war.

At that time,

just as today, members of all Yugoslav peoples and na
tionalities assembled here in togetherness.

Many of you

here remember how in those days nothing was difficult and
how people felt that everything was easy and possible in
the freedom.

It is in this freedom that the citizens of

Belgrade and of our entire country have succeeded in
accomplishing much.

Today,

feeling angry because of the

crisis in which we have found ourselves, we are inclined
to forget everything good and worthy which we have creat-
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ed by ourselves,

and which we have created with joy.

It is true that we have halted on the road to the
society we had aspired to during the revolution,

but it

is not true that we cannot create such a society,
must renounce that road.

that we

What we have to do is to change

many concepts and many people in politics to make our
life better.

We will do this through a great social

reform which we must carry out.

The most important thing

we must resolve at this time is to establish peace and
order in Kosovo.

There is no other more urgent task for

Serbia nor should there be more important task for all of
Yugoslavia, because the solidarity of the Yugoslav
peoples and especially of Yugoslav workers has always
been their greatest and strongest characteristic.

It has

been manifested in the assistance which we have extended
to the oppressed people,

the workers'

individuals throughout the world.

class,

and even

For this reason,

it is

difficult to explain why that solidarity has been late in
manifesting itself to a greater extent,

faster and with

greater love when citizens of our own country are con
cerned.

The long absence of this solidarity with the

boundless suffering of the Serbs and Montenegrins in
Kosovo represents an incurable wound to their hearts and
to the heart of all of Serbia.
But this is no time for sorrow;

it is time for
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struggle.

This awareness captured Serbia last summer and

this awareness has turned into a material force that will
stop the terror in Kosovo and unite Serbia.

This is a

process which no longer can be stopped by any force, a
process in the face of which all fear is weak. People
will consent to live in poverty but they will never
consent to live without freedom;

at least not people

gathered here and the people in Serbia,

to whom I myself

belong and therefore I know that they can only live in
freedom and in no other way.

Both the Turkish and the

German invaders know that these people win their battles
for freedom.

We entered both world wars with nothing but

the conviction that we would fight for freedom,
won both wars.

and we

Now we have the unified LC stances on

Kosovo and we shall implement them energetically to the
very end.
We shall win the battle for Kosovo regardless of the
obstacles facing us inside and outside the country.
I mean here are perplexed conclusions,
confused announcements,
restaurant tables,

What

secret meetings,

negotiations carried out at

unscrupulous interpretations of

Yugoslav reality in the world,

allege ambiguous but in

fact, hostile statements to the press,

a host of petty

and dirty tricks aimed at calming down people who are
great in heart,

for such tricks cannot frighten them.
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Thus we shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies
outside the country are plotting against it, along with
those in the country.

We tell them that we do not

frighten easily, and that we enter every battle with the
aim of winning it.
We have never waged unjust and dishonest battles
that would be to the detriment of other people.
people,

The

all citizens regardless of their nationality and

profession,

are at the head of this battle for Kosovo.

And there is no battle in the world that the people have
lost.

The leadership has little choice here:

It shall

either head the people and listen to their voice,

or time

will push it aside and its existence will be recorded in
history only briefly and for the bad things alone.
Nobody should be surprised that entire Serbia rose
up last summer because of Kosovo.
center of Serbia's history,

Kosovo is the very

its culture,

and its memory.

All people have a love that is warming their heart for
ever.

For a Serb that love is Kosovo.

Kosovo must remain in Serbia.
expense of Albanians.

That is why

That will not be at the

I can tell the Albanians in Kosovo

that nobody has ever found it difficult to live in Serbia
because he is not Serbian.
to everybody:

Serbia has always been open

For those who have no houses,

and the rich alike,

for the poor

for the happy and the desperate,

for
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those who were only passing through and for those who
wanted to stay. The only people Serbia did not want were
evil and bad people even when they were Serbs.
All the Albanians in Kosovo who trust other people
and who respect the other people living in Kosovo and
Serbia are in their own country.

I now ask them to rally

against the evil and hatred of their own chauvinists
because they do not cause evil only to Serbs and
Montenegrins,

but also to their own Albanian people.

They embarrass their people in front of the entire world,
shame it before its children and offend its dignity.
the sake of all this,

For

I call on the Albanians throughout

Kosovo and say to them that instead of the police and
Army units, Albanian mothers and fathers should tend to
the peaceful dreams,

calm schooling,

and carefree games

of Serb and Montenegrin girls and boys.

This is not so

because such division of care is more efficient,
because it is more humane, more honest,

but

and because it is

more appropriate to socialism and the ideals for which we
in Yugoslavia all strive.
Now,

let us remind the Yugoslav peoples,

rs' class, the youth,

the w o r k e 

and the Communists that half a

century ago even Spain was not far away.

Many people

then went to fight in its barricades against terror and
hatred.

Terror and hatred run riot in Kosovo today,

and
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Kosovo is in our country of Yugoslavia.

In the fight

against Kosovo evil it is not necessary to sacrifice
lives as was done in Spain.

One only needs to take an

oath, which we Yugoslavs had already given to each other
in 1941, that in brotherhood and unity we will share
everything,

both the good and the bad, as well as v icto

ry, injustice, poverty,

that we will build a new and

better world.
Comrades,

the day after tomorrow,

the Serbian LC will open here.
ed to the reform.

a conference of

This conference is d evot

The reform which we need to carry out

concerns great social changes which should take place as
soon as possible.

The most important changes should take

place

in the field of economy.

raise

the standard of living of the entire society and

every

individual.

concerned,

These changes should
of

As far as the political system is

the changes should establish the unity in

Serbia as a republic and its equality with other repub
lics in Yugoslavia.

The reform should improve and remedy

everything that is of importance to people's lives:
prices, medical care,
system.

education,

and the information

They should facilitate a more successful and

freer development of sciences and arts so that our
culture can reach other countries and peoples and con
tribute to the progressive changes in the world.

They
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should contribute toward everything in society,
done openly,

if it is

so that people compulsorily and regularly

bear responsibility for the results of their work.

This

is a great program which we can realize only if we remain
resolute and united as we have been in the last few
months and here today.
This kind of reform represents an expression of the
needs of the working people and citizens of Serbia.

The

leadership of the republic understands this reform as its
obligation to those who have elected it.

This reform

will lead to changes which should be implemented through
out entire Yugoslavia.

I am convinced that in the forth

coming months all Yugoslav peoples,

all citizens of

Yugoslavia, will find the strength to overcome differenc
es, intolerance,

and clashes,

that they will jointly and

fraternally succeed in preserving,
ing their country.

renewing,

and develop

Tito's Yugoslavia is the result of a

struggle, work, and love of all of Yugoslav peoples and
nationalities.
Today, when Yugoslavia is experiencing difficulties,
we should all together raise our voices and wake up our
hearts,

use our brains and unite our forces in order to

preserve our country.

Yugoslavia was

created in a

magnificent revolution by Yugoslav Communists,
slav worker's class, and Yugoslav peoples.

the Yugo

Yugoslavia
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will not die at the conference table as its enemies hope.
Yugoslavia was created by a huge struggle and will defend
itself through a huge struggle.
Yugoslavia,
Serbia!

our country!

Long live socialist

Long live free and united SR of

Long live Belgrade,

capital city of our country

which is always open to all good and to all progressive
ideas!

Long live the courage with which we always fought

for freedom and justice! Long live the comrades who
gathered here at the meeting for brotherhood and unity,
for Yugoslavia,

and for better days!
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